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Research scientists often receive compensation, typically honoraria,
for giving speeches, writing books or articles, providing advice, and
answering questions about their research.' Although these activities
are generally extra-employment, a strong connection is customarily
present between the subject matter of the expression and the
scientist's area of professional expertise.2 In some circumstances
these activities can create financial conflicts of interest for scientists,'
but the receipt of modest honoraria from private sources has many
beneficial effects and the practice is generally encouraged in
academia and private industry.'
1. See Proposed Regulations of the Office of Government Ethics for the Standards of Conduct of
Executive Branch Employees: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Human Resources of the House Comm. on
Post Office and Civil Service, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 173 (1991) [hereinafter Office of Government
Ethics Hearing] (statement of Robert J. Cousins, Ph.D., President, Fed'n of Am. Societies for
Experimental Biology (FASEB)) ("Scientists in academia and industry are encouraged to engage
in such activities as giving guest lectures at other institutions, consulting, writing textbooks and
articles, or serving as editors ofscientificjournals... [and] they may receive compensation for
these activities.").
2. Id. at 171.
3. Seegenerally COMMrTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, ARE SCIENTIFC MISCONDUcT AND
CONFLICTS OF INTERESr HAZARDOUS TO OUR HEALTH?, H.R. REP. No. 688, 101st Cong., 2d Sess.
(1990) [hereinafter SCIENTmIC MISCONDUcr REPORT) (describing cases of plagiarism, biased
research findings, and purposeful misrepresentations by scientists linked to financial conflicts
of interest); Michael D. Witt & Lawrence 0. Gostin, Conflict of Interest Dilemmas in Biomedical
Research, 271 JAMA 547, 547-48 (1994) (defining problem of conflict of interest in biomedical
research and making recommendations for resolution).
4. See Robert C. Young, Honoraria Ban for Federal Workers Will Dismantle Scientific Expertise:
Inflexible Net of Rules May Drive Talent Away, WASH. POST, Jan. 14, 1992, at H6 (noting that
scientists gain credibility by participating in conferences and writing for peer-reviewed journals
and other academic literature); cf. Witt & Gostin, supra note 3, at 550 (stating that most
institutional guidelines encourage honoraria in return forfinished work and that practice should
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Many government agencies have scientific missions and either
employ scientists directly or provide funding for scientists employed
outside the government' The National Institutes of Health (NIH),
for example, employs scientists with different biomedical research
specialties in each of its sixteen institutes and provides research grants
to scientists employed by academic institutions.6 Until recently,
scientists employed by the government were subject to an honorarium
ban, which prohibited them from participating in extra-employment
activities for compensation. This ban is embodied in § 501 (b) of the
Ethics Reform Act of 1989.v
Section 501 (b) precludes all federal employees, including scientists,
from receiving honoraria from non-governmental sources for activities
outside their official duties.' The Ethics Reform Act defines honorar-
ium as "a payment of money or any thing of value for an appearance,
speech or article."9 Congress did not direct the honorarium ban
toward federal scientists, instead § 501 (b) was motivated by concerns
about the appearance of influence-buying when legislators accepted
compensation from special-interest groups."° Nevertheless, the ban
be encouraged by "least stringent guidelines").
This Comment focuses on scientists in general, and biomedical research scientists in
particular, because of the unique issues the honorarium ban poses for this group of federal
government employees. The issue of whether members of a particular profession should accept
honoraria from "interested" groups, however, has broader appeal. For example, a recent
Washington Post article discussed the practice among high-profile journalists of accepting
speaking fees of up to $50,000 from corporations or special-interest groups. Howard Kurtz,
Money Talks, WASH. POST, Jan. 21, 1996, (Magazine), at 11-15. Many of the journalists
recognized the appearance of impropriety or influence-buying created by this practice but
defended their ability to remain objective and impartial in reporting the news. Id. at 23.
5. See generally OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL REGISTER/NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND REcoRDs
ADMINISTRATION, THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT MANUAL 1995/1996 (describing scientific
purposes of government entities such as Public Health Service, Environmental Protection
Service, Department of Energy, and National Science Foundation).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 241(a) (3) (1994) (authorizing Secretary of Health and Human Services to
give grants to "universities, hospitals, laboratories, and other public and private institutions" for
research projects); see also NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH REVITAuZATION ACT OF 1993, H.R.
REP. No. 28, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 54 (1993) [hereinafter NIH HOUSE REPORT]. Some of the
more well known research institutes at NIH include the National Cancer Institute; the National
Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute; the National Institute on Diabetes and Digestive and Kidney
Disease; the National Institute on Aging; and the National Eye Institute. National Institutes of
Health Revitalization Act of 1993: Heating on HR. 4 Before the Subcomm. on Health and the
Environment of the House Comm. on EnerW and Commerce, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 177 (1993)
(statement of Rep. Dingell).
7. Ethics Reform Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-194, § 601(a), 103 Stat. 1760 (codified at
5 U.S.C. app. § 501(b) (1994)).
8. 5 U.S.C. app. § 501(b) (1994).
9. Id. § 505(3).
10. See 135 CONG. REc. H8749 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 1989) (statement of Rep. Brown) (noting
that decision to disallow honoraria was motivated by "appearance of impropriety" when members
of Congress accepted payment from private sources); iU at H8751 (statement of Rep. Obey)
(arguing that supplementing income from private sources creates conflict of interest); see also
Joan Biskupic, Court Allows Honoraria for Federal Rank and File, WASH. POST, Feb. 23, 1995, at Al,
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was not limited to members of the legislative branch.1 Section
501 (b) prohibits receipt of honoraria by members of the executive
and judicial branches as well. 2 Thus, Congress stopped government
scientists from accepting honoraria without evaluating the appropri-
ateness of this practice for scientists or comparing the ban to
regulations in place for scientists employed outside the government.
When enacted, the proscription against honoraria applied to all
federal employees, regardless of rank. 3 On February 22, 1995,
however, the United States Supreme Court decided United States v.
National Treasury Employees Union (NTEU),' 4 which upheld a lower
court finding that the honorarium ban violated the First Amendment
rights of executive branch employees below the grade of GS-16.'5 As
a factor in finding that the honorarium ban contained in § 501 (b)
was not narrowly tailored, the Court cited failure of the ban to
require a nexus between the government employee's job and the
subject matter of the expressive activity.'" The Court declined the
invitation to impose its own nexus requirement onto the statute and
struck down the ban for career executive branch employees below a
certain rank.
1 7
Even before the NTEU decision, members of Congress were
concerned that the ban was too broad because it prohibited receipt
of honoraria for all expressive activity-related or unrelated to an
employee'sjob. Since 1991, Congress has considered several bills that
would restrict the ban to expressive activities that have a nexus to a
government employee's job." For instance, legislation introduced
in 1991, 1993, and 1995 would have prohibited receipt of honoraria
only if the compensated activity related to the official duties of the
A9 (distinguishing acceptance of honoraria by legislators from acceptance by low-level executive
branch employees).
11. SeeREPORT OF THE BIPARTISAN TASK FORCE ON ETHIcS, 101sT CONG., lST SESS. (Comm.
Print 1989), 135 CONG. REc. H9253-56 (daily ed. Nov. 21, 1989) [hereinafter BIPARTISAN TASK
FORCE REPORT] (describing concerns stemming from acceptance of significant amount of
honoraria by members of Congress).
12. 5 U.S.C. app. § 501(b).
13. Id.
14. 115 S. Ct. 1003 (1995).
15. United States v. National Treasury Employees Union (NTEU), 115 S. Ct. 1003, 1015
(1995), aff'g in part, rev'g in part 990 F.2d 1271 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
16. Id. at 1016-17 (noting that speech unrelated to government employment should not be
limited by government merely because of "administrative convenience" of banning all expressive
activities).
17. Id. at 1019.
18. See, e.g., H.R. 1639, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); H.R. 1095, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1993); H.R. 109, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). Each of these bills attempted to limit the
honorarium ban to expressive activities that relate to government employment. The bills are
discussed in detail infra Part II.C.3.
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government employee. 19 While no bills of this nature successfully
navigated their way through Congress, the NTEU decision is likely to
rekindle the legislative effort to include a nexus requirement.0
This Comment contends that prohibiting scientists from accepting
honoraria for expressive activities, whether related or unrelated to
their area of employment, does not further the interests of the
researchers, the government, or the public. Within specified
guidelines, scientists should be able to receive honoraria for sharing
information with their peers and the public. Part I examines the
importance of honoraria in the field of scientific research. This
section includes an overview of laws encouraging collaboration of
scientific research in government, academic, and private institutions.
Part II provides background information about the passage and
purposes of the Ethics Reform Act of 1989, which contains the
honorarium ban. This section also discusses the Court's NTEU
decision and criticizes the distinction between expressive activities that
are related or unrelated to government employment. Part III analyzes
existing and proposed legislation that would limit the honorarium
prohibition to outside activities that have a nexus to employment.
Part IV describes honorarium regulations governing scientists who are
not employed by the government. This section concludes that the
benefits flowing from receipt of honoraria for disclosure and
dissemination of scientific information outweigh the costs. Govern-
ment scientists should be subject to honoraria regulations similar to
those governing their peers in academia and private industry because
these regulations provide sufficient protection against misconduct,
promote the free exchange of information, and encourage scientists
to engage in public service.
I. ROLE OF HONORARIA IN SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH
To understand the impact of limits on expressive activity for
scientists, such as the honorarium prohibition, it is first necessary to
understand the importance of outside professional activities for these
individuals. Receipt of honoraria does not itself cause a problem. As
a recent article in a leading medical journal stated, the problem
"arises when objectivity, truth telling, and disclosing results of
19. See, eg., H.R. 1639, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); H.R. 1095, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1993); H.R. 109, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); see also infra Part IIl. (discussing legislative
proposals to modify honorarium ban).
20. Representative Barney Frank introduced a bill on May 15, 1995, to modify the
honorarium prohibition. H.R. 1639, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); see also infra Part III.C
(discussing series of unenacted bills designed to add nexus requirement to honorarium ban).
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research, all essential to scientific rigor and integrity, are compro-
mised by the desire for greater reward."2 As science has become
increasingly commercialized over the past twenty-five years, the
number and diversity of financial interests for scientists has in-
creased.22 The challenge in assessing potential financial conflicts of
interest for scientists is to distinguish interests that promote objectivi-
ty, truthfulness, or disclosure from interests that encourage bias,
misrepresentation, or secrecy. In the absence of financial conflicts of
interest that compromise research, scientists employed by both
government and private institutions should be allowed to accept
honoraria for disclosing and discussing their findings and theories.
A. Honoraria Is Important to All Scientists but Government Scientists Are
Subject to the Ban
Many scientists who are not employed by the federal government
nevertheless have their research paid for with federal funds.23
Although these scientists conduct the same type of research per-
formed by their government counterparts and are paid by the same
source-the public-the regulations governing the two groups are
different.
Unlike government scientists, scientists serving at academic
institutions and in private industry are not only encouraged to give
speeches and publish articles,24 but are also allowed to accept
compensation for engaging in these activities.' Researchers receive
honoraria for publishing articles or books, giving lectures, and
presenting research findings.26 These activities promote the free
exchange of information among scientists, which fosters improved
21. Witt & Gostin, supra note 3, at 550.
22. See Is Sdence for Sale? Conflicts of Interest vs. the Public Interest: Hearing Before the Human
Resources and Intergovernmental Relations Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Gov't Operations, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess. 179 (1989) [hereinafter Is ScienceforSale.] (statement of Erich Bloch, Director,
Nat'l Science Found.) (listing increased potential for misconduct by scientists due to financial
interests).
23. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Propriety Rights and the Norms of Scence in Biotechnology Research,
97YALE LJ. 177, 178 n.2 (1987) (noting that in 1984 federal funds of $5,386,578,000 supported
research at academic institutions).
24. Office of Government Ethics Hearing, supra note 1, at 173 (statement of RobertJ. Cousins);
see id. at 417 (statement of Dep't of Health & Human Servs.) (discussing traditional role of
scientists to teach, deliver speeches, and write in effort to support exchange of scientific
knowledge).
25. See Office of Government Ethics Hearing, supra note 1, at 430-31 (letter of Robert J.
Cousins).
26. See Rick Weiss, NIH: The Price of Neglect, 251 ScaENcE 508, 510 (1991) (noting
supplementary income benefit of honoraria).
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understanding of health issues.27 Honoraria payments provide
incentives for scientists to share information with their peers and the
public.2"
Subjecting government scientists to regulations that do not affect
their counterparts in academia and private industry creates a negative
disparity among scientists and a disincentive for scientists to work for
the federal government. 9  The honoraria restriction deprives
government employees, the public, and government institutions of the
benefits that result from these activities. Extra-employment profes-
sional activities promote discovery and dissemination of scientific
information, 30 enhance professional development for the scientist,3'
and increase prestige for the employing institution.3 2 In the aggre-
gate, denial of compensation for expressive activities, and their
resultant benefits, may lead to recruitment and retention problems
for federal scientific institutions.33
27. See Modiffing the Honoraria Prohibition for Federal Employees: Hearing on H.R. 325 Before the
Subcomm. on Administrative Law and GovernmentalRelations of the House Comm. on theJudidary, 102d
Cong., 1st Sess. 65 (1991) [hereinafter Modifying the Honoraria Prohibition Hearing] (statement of
Ass'n of Am. Med. Colleges) ("[S]uch activities ... involve the dissemination of knowledge
linked to medical advances and improved understanding of human health and disease.").
28. See United States v. NTEU, 115 S. Ct. 1003, 1014 (1995) (acknowledging incentive to
engage in expressive activity provided by promise of payment).
29. See Office of Government Ethics Hearing, supra note 1, at 347 (statement of Richard L.
Crowell, Ph.D., President, Am. Soc'y for Microbiology (ASM)) (predicting that denial of
compensation for government microbiologists would deny them opportunities enjoyed by peers
employed in private sector).
30. See Eisenberg, supra note 23, at 181-84 (describing traditional scientific norms, which
encourage prompt publication and disclosure of new observations); see also NTEU, 115 S. Ct. at
1012 (acknowledging that government employees contribute to "marketplace of ideas"); Office
of Government Ethics Hearing, supra note 1, at 347 (statement of Richard L. Crowell) (stating that
"scientific endeavors... are essential to the free exchange of scientific information"); id. at 361
(statement of Ass'n of Am. Med. Colleges) (maintaining that free exchange of information
"speeds the process of scientific discovery and the translation of research results into medically-
beneficial developments").
31. See Office of Government Ethics Hearing, supra note 1, at 173 (statement of Robert J.
Cousins) ("The professional advancement of government scientists is unfairly and unreasonably
disadvantaged by forbidding those activities."); itl at 176 (statement of Michael E. Lamm, M.D.,
President, Am. Ass'n of Pathologists (AAP)) (explaining that career advancement in science is
accomplished by participating in professional activities such as oral presentations and article
publications); id. at 424 (letter of Larry R. Faulkner, President, Electrochem. Soc'y) (stating that
preventing government scientists from engaging in outside professional activities will reduce
competence).
32. See Office of Government Ethics Hearing, supra note 1, at 170 (statement of Robert J.
Cousins) (indicating that preventing government scientists at NIH, Centers for Disease Control,
and other federal agencies from participating in professional activities harms reputation of those
institutions).
33. See Office of Government Ethics Hearing; supra note 1, at 174 (statement of Robert J.
Cousins) (stating that ban on outside professional activities, including teaching, speaking, and
writing, would negatively affect government recruitment and retention of top researchers); iL
at 176 (statement of Michael E. Lamm) (discussing salary structure and restrictive employment
regulations as disincentive for federally employed scientists); id. at 356 (statement of Frank G.
Standaert, M.D., President, Am. Soc'y for Pharmacology & Experimental Therapeutics)
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Unfortunately, honoraria may also provide incentives for scientists
to consciously or unconsciously bias their expressive output.3
Although compensating a scientist can create a conflict of interest,
universities and private employers recognize that regulation of receipt
of financial compensation for speeches or articles is better than a flat
ban.
35
B. Specter of Scientific Misconduct
Researchers who falsify or fabricate data for any reason are guilty
of scientific misconduct, 6 which can have severe consequences for
the public health. 37 From 1988 to 1990, a House Subcommittee held
a series of hearings to investigate scientific misconduct and conflicts
of interest among researchers receiving federal funds .3  The ten
cases profiled in that investigation revealed diverse forms and
amounts of financial conflicts of interest. 9 One case involved
researchers at a university who examined the effects of antibiotics on
children's ear infections.' The study concluded that drug treatment
was effective, thereby increasing prescriptions and sales of the
antibiotics." When one of the researchers questioned the positive
results of the study, an investigation revealed that the principal
(recognizing that private sector employment is more attractive due to limitations on government
scientists); id. at 417 (statement of Dep't of Health & Human Servs.) (warning that restrictive
standards will cause recruitment problems and encourage staff to seek private employment).
34. See SCIENTIFIC MIscoNDUCr REPORT, supra note 3, at 6 (noting that "potential conflicts
of interest may lead to misrepresentation of data").
35. Cf. SCIENTIFIC MIsCoNDuCT REPORT, supra note 3, at 71 (suggesting that scientists with
financial conflicts may still be best qualified and that enforcing disclosure requirements may
provide better alternative than prohibiting such persons from conducting research).
36. See SCIENTIFIC MISCONDUCT REPORT, supra note 3, at 10-50 (providing facts surrounding
10 cases of alleged misconduct, including instances of financial conflicts by individuals,
institutions, and even investigators of allegations).
37. See SCIENTIFIC MISCONDUCT REPORT, supra note 3, at 65 (concluding that scientific
misconduct may result in misrepresentations implicating safety and efficacy of drugs thereby
endangering public).
38. The hearings are described in a House Report. See SCIENTIFIC MISCONDUCT REPORT,
supra note 3.
39. SCIENTIFIC MISCONDUCT REPORT, supra note 3, at 10. One research study involved a
series of clinical studies known as the Thrombolysis in Myocardial Infarction (TIMI) trials. Id.
at 19. The TIMI trials were to compare the effectiveness of t-PA and streptokinase. Id. The
Subcommittee hearings reported that "at least 13 of the researchers involved in the NIH-funded
research owned stock [or stock options] in Genentech," the maker of t-PA. Id. at 21.
Allegations that the researchers emphasized data favorable to t-PA and failed to report data
favorable to streptokinase had not been resolved at the time of the hearings. Id.
40. SCIENTIFIC MISCONDUCT REPORT, supra note 3, at 28. Despite questions about their
efficacy, annual expenditures for drug treatment of children's middle ear infections exceed $400
million. Id. The principal investigator in the research on their effectiveness failed to disclose
significant financial support and honoraria received from drug companies with an interest in
the outcome of the federally funded studies. Id. at 29-31.
41. SCIENTIFIC MISCONDUCT REPORT, supra note 3, at 28.
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researcher had received more than $50,000 in honoraria from the
three pharmaceutical companies producing the antibiotics.
42
Regardless of what activities the researcher performed to justify
payment of the honoraria, this transaction appears inappropriate
because of the relationship between the payor and the researcher's
work.
Despite suspicious relationships such as this one, elimination of
situations in which a researcher has some sort of economic involve-
ment with private industry is likely to be neither possible nor
desirable.4' The increased media attention given to cases of alleged
scientific misconduct has helped the research community recognize
the need for development of standards and regulations.' The NIH
recently promulgated such regulations,45 and many other institutions
already have guidelines in place. In general, these guidelines
recognize the potential for compromise of research design, method,
or reporting of results when potentially inconsistent financial interests
42. SCIENTIFIC MISCONDUCT REPORT, supra note 3, at 30.
43. See Modifying the Honoraria Prohibition Hearing, supra note 27, at 65 (statement of Ass'n
of Am. Med. Colleges) (including sharing of information and improving knowledge of health
and disease as benefits of lectures and articles by Veterans Administration physicians); Witt &
Gostin, supra note 3, at 550 (declaring eradication of all conflicts impossible and acknowledging
benefits to public health from collaboration by "knowledgeable, well-funded investigators").
44. See Sharon Begley & Mary Hager, Open Season on Science, NExvSWEEFK, Dec. 16, 1991, at
65 (declaring that image of American science has been tarnished by allegations of fraud and
misuse of taxpayer dollars). Scientists may recognize the need for regulation, but the task has
not been easy. The NIH initially published proposed guidelines for conflicts of interest in the
NIH Guide for Grants and Contracts on September 15, 1989, and requested comments. Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking, 59 Fed. Reg. 33,242 (proposed June 28, 1994). Seven hundred and
fifty-one responses were received from individuals associated with medical research, government,
business, and law. Id. The majority of people who responded criticized the regulations for
imposing an undue burden on individuals and institutions receiving federal funds. Id. The
guidelines required disclosure of outside funding, consultant positions, and honoraria, and
prohibited holding of equity or options in companies with an interest in the outcome of
research. Id. These proposed guidelines were withdrawn due to enormous opposition and new
regulations were not proposed again until June 28, 1994. Id. The new proposals reduce the
scope of required financial disclosure, focus primarily on clinical rather than basic research, and
leave discretion in the hands of individual institutions. Id. There were over 100 comments on
the new proposals, most of which supported allowing institutions discretion to identify and
resolve financial conflicts of interest. 60 Fed. Reg. 35,810 (1995). The new rules became
effective on October 1, 1995 and will be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 50 and 45 C.F.R. § 94. Id.; see
also Witt & Gostin, supra note 3, at 548 (describing criticism of original guidelines and
summarizing character of subsequent proposal).
45. See 60 Fed. Reg. 35,810 (establishing standards and procedures regarding conflicts of
interest for research institutions applying for Public Health Service funding).
46. See, e.g., American Federation for Clinical Research Guidelines for Avoiding Conflicts of Interest
38 J. CLINICAL RES. 239, 239 (1990); Council on Scientific Affairs and Council on Ethical and
Judicial Affairs, Am. Med. Ass'n, Conflicts of Interest in Medical Center/Industry Research Relationships,
263JAMA 2790, 2790 (1990); Ass'n of Am. Med. Colleges Ad Hoc Comm. on Misconduct of
Interest in Research, Guidelines for Dealing with Faculty Conflicts of Commitment and Conflicts of
Interest in Research, 65 ACAD. MED. 487, 487 (1990).
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are present, but do not recommend a flat prohibition against financial
conflicts of interest.
47
Over the past twenty years, the types of financial interests available
to research scientists have increased." One of the problems
associated with some forms of financial interests for scientists is
increased secrecy and withholding of information.49 In contrast,
payment of honoraria for expressive activities provides incentives for
scientists to share information. Along with expanding the types of
financial conflicts, the commercialization of science has also altered
the atmosphere at many research institutions and influenced the
direction of research projects. At a time when many forms of
financial arrangements inhibit disclosure of research data, compensa-
tion that promotes the free exchange of information should be
encouraged. 0
C. Commercialization of Science
The commercialization of science gradually emerged in the 1980s,
when the Supreme Court 1 and Congress 2 established proprietary
rights in scientific discoveries. Allowance of ownership interests in
scientific discoveries, combined with legislation encouraging joint
47. See Witt & Gostin, supra note 3, at 548-49 (summarizing and comparing current rules
and guidelines established by American Medical Association, American Federation for Clinical
Research, Association of Medical Colleges, and Harvard Medical School).
48. See Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 483 (Cal. 1990) (expanding
doctrine of informed consent to require physicians to "disclose personal interests unrelated to
the patient's health, whether research or economic, that may affect the physician's professional
judgment"). Original concerns about conflicts of interest dealt with researchers who put the
interests of science ahead of the interests of patients or research subjects. SeeMARCA. RODWIN,
MEDICINE, MONEY, AND MORAtS: PHYSIcIANs' CoNFIuCr OF INTEREST 46-48 (1993) (describing
concern of reformers in 1960s who felt that researchers were more interested in advancement
of science than patient welfare); Charles C. Mann, Radiation: Balancing the Record, 263 SCIENCE
470, 472 (1994) (detailing radiation experiments conducted before ethical standard were
developed and noting that ethical flaws did not obviate scientific value of data).
49. See Eisenberg, supra note 23, at 206-07 (discussing interaction of patent law and
traditional scientific incentives and noting that patent system of exclusive rights is in conflict
with scientific community's goals of disclosure and dissemination); see also Is Sciencefor Sale?,
supra note 22, at 179 (statement of Erich Bloch) (listing withholding of information, biased
interpretation, and inducement to commitfraud as potential consequences ofindustry-university
research partnerships).
50. See Office of Government Ethics Hearing, supra note 1, at 173 (statement of Robert J.
Cousins) (extolling information sharing benefits of scientists' expressive activities such as
furthering exchange of scientific knowledge, advancing scientific careers, and enhancing
reputation of employing institution).
51. SeeDiamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303,310 (1980) (holding that live microorganism
is patentable subject matter).
52. See Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-480, 94 Stat.
2311 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 3701-3714 (1994)); Bayh-Dole Act, Pub. L. No. 96.
517, 94 Stat. 3015 (1980) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-211 (1994)); Federal
Technology Transfer Act of 1986, Pub. L No. 99-502, 100 Stat. 1785 (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. §§ 3701-3714 (1994)). For a discussion of these acts, see infra Part I.C.2.
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projects between researchers and profitmaking entities," introduced
complex economic incentives into the research arena. Some of these
economic incentives have encouraged scientists to keep results secret
until they can profit personally from their research.54 The increased
secrecy in scientific research that stems from commercialization may
be countered in part by providing incentives for scientists to disclose
and discuss research findings. Allowing scientists to receive honoraria
for speaking and writing about their work provides such an incentive.
1. Judicial incentive to collaborate
The Supreme Court's 1980 decision in Diamond v. Chakrabarty5
opened the door for the commercialization of scientific research.56
In Diamond, the Court extended patent protection to a
microbiologist's modification of a living organism.57 The patentee
in Diamond developed a new form of bacterium capable of breaking
down crude oil.58 He believed the bacterium would be valuable in
the clean-up of oil spills and sought to patent the discovery.5 9 The
Patent Office, however, did not believe patents were intended to cover
living microorganisms and, therefore, repeatedly denied his patent
application.6 °
The Supreme Court reversed the denial of the patent applica-
tion.61 In doing so, the Court sought to fulfill the patent statute's
goal of "promoting 'the Progress of Science and the useful Arts.'"
6
1
This decision introduced proprietary interests into the world of
biological research.63 At about the same time, the desire to promote
progress in science prompted Congress to pass a series of statutes that
further eliminated impediments to the commercialization of science.'
53. See Charles Weiner, Universities, Professors, and Patents: A Continuing Contnnersy, TEcH.
REV., Feb.-Mar. 1986, at 32, 42 (noting transformation of researchers from academicians and
scientists to industry consultants and equity partners in corporations).
54. See Kathleen Day, The Gene Therapy Gamble 2 Md Research Firms Bet Big in a Field Were
Risks, Rewards CanBeHuge, WASH. PosT, Nov. 7,1994, (Wash. Bus.), at I (discussing commercial
interests of pharmaceutical companies and noting that companies have kept research results
confidential until profit potential was protected).
55. 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
56. See Weiner, supra note 53, at 41-42 (crediting Diamond decision with "open[ing] the
gates to commercializing the results of biological research," with researchers becoming financial
partners with private industry).
57. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 318 (1980).
58. Id. at 305.
59. Id. at 305-06.
60. Id. at 306.
61. Id. at 309.
62. Id. at 315 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 101).
63. See id. at 310 (observing that patentee's discovery of new bacterium with new
characteristics and potential for significant utility is patentable subject matter).
64. See infra Part I.C.2 (describing content and consequences of legislation).
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2. Legislative incentives to collaborate
About fifteen years ago, Congress realized that discoveries made
through federally funded research were not being translated into
applied technologies that could benefit the public.65 Legislators
decided to increase interactions among government, academic
institutions, and private industry.66 In 1980, Congress passed both
the Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act (Stevenson-Wydler
Act)67 and the Patent and Trademark Amendment Act of 1980,
commonly known as the Bayh-Dole Act.' These Acts, referred to as
technology-transfer statutes, describe the importance of continued
innovation for the "economic, environmental, and social well-
being"69 of the United States. To promote innovation and utilization
of technologies, these statutes encourage collaborative efforts through
expansion of proprietary rights.
The Stevenson-Wydler Act promotes technology transfer by
encouragingjoint projects among developers, marketers, and users of
technology.7" With the Bayh-Dole Act, Congress amended the Patent
and Trademark Act7' to encourage research collaborations among
small businesses and non-profit entities.72 The Bayh-Dole Act
allowed recipients of federal funds to apply for patents for products
developed with government money.73
Before passage of these statutes, the government retained propri-
etary rights to almost all technologies developed with federal
money.74 These statutes encouraged collaboration between academ-
ic institutions and private companies, with the goal of facilitating
movement of products from research laboratories to practical
65. See Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96480, 94 Stat.
2311 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 3701(1) (1994)) (describing importance of industry-
government interaction and cooperation to ensure that nation's health needs are addressed as
rapidly as possible).
66. See id. § 3701(3) (noting that collaboration is desirable because most scientific
discoveries occur in universities and federal laboratories but business is largely responsible for
practical application).
67. Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-480,94 Stat. 2311
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 3701-3714 (1994)).
68. Bayh-Dole Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (1980) (codified as amended at 35
U.S.C. §§ 200-211 (1994)).
69. 15 U.S.C. § 3701(1) (1994).
70. 15 U.S.C. §§ 3701-3714.
71. 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-211 (1994).
72. Seeid.
73. IL §§ 202-210.
74. See iU. § 200 (ensuring that federal government obtains rights to inventions supported
by federal funds).
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application in the marketplace.75 The Stevenson-Wydler and Bayh-
Dole Acts successfully stimulated interaction between federally funded
researchers and private companies. But federal employees still could
not take advantage of expanded patent rights because these Acts
applied only to recipients of federal funds.7  Researchers employed
directly by the government did not have the same rights as research-
ers receiving federal funds.
To address this problem, Congress passed the Federal Technology
Transfer Act of 1986 (Technology Transfer Act). 7 The Technology
Transfer Act extended patent and licensing rights to federal laborato-
ries,78 resulting in over 150 collaborative projects between federal
scientists and individual companies.79 The benefits for collaborators
include additional funding for promising health research projects,
increased scientific knowledge, and increased commercial productivi-
ty.10 In addition to benefiting the participants themselves, increased
interaction among government, universities, and industry benefits the
public through improved health services,8 improved standards of
living, 2 and creation of new employment opportunities.8"
3. Adverse consequences of research collaboration and commercialization
Unfortunately, the commercialization of science has also had
adverse consequences. The increased focus on proprietary rights and
joint projects has altered the traditional atmosphere at academic and
75. SeeWitt & Gostin, supra note 3, at 547 (observing that federal legislation since 1980 has
fostered collaborations between universities and private sector and moved products to
marketplace quickly).
76. See generally Lawrence Rudolph, Overview of Federal Technology Transfer, 5 RiSK: HEALTH
SAFETY & ENV'T 133 (1994) (reviewing technology transfer statutes and noting that Stevenson-
Wydler and Bayh-Dole Acts covered government-owned, contractor-operated labs (GoCos) while
Federal TechnologyTransferAct of 1986 covered government-owned, government-operated labs
(GoCos)).
77. Federal Technology Transfer Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-502, 100 Stat. 1785 (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 3701-3714 (1994)) (recognizing discovery of potentially useful
scientific and technological developments in federal laboratories).
78. 15 U.S.C. § 3710a(a) (2) (1994).
79. SeeJohn Carey, NIH Is Not the Institution It Was, Bus. WK., Nov. 5, 1990, at 145, 148
(discussing joint venture license agreement based upon collaboration between industry and
NIH).
80. See David Blumenthal, Academic-Industry Relationships in the Life Sciences; Extent,
Consequences, and Managemen4 268 JAMA 3344, 3345 (1992) (enumerating benefits and risks of
collaborations such as increase in secrecy and damage to public opinion of scientific research
in academic-industry collaborations).
81. 15 U.S.C. § 3701(9) (1994).
82. Id. § 3701(2).
83. See id. § 3701 (describing congressional finding that technology transfer promotes
productivity, jobs, and U.S. competitiveness in international markets).
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government research institutions.84 Scientific researchers used to be
rewarded for contributing to the communal body of scientific
knowledge.' Traditional rewards, such as increased knowledge,
recognition by colleagues, and career advancement are now frequent-
ly subordinate to a promise of financial gain.8" Researchers are
increasingly reluctant to share information and results.8 7 The
existence of a profit potential decreases the incentive for researchers
to publish or present their findings promptly.' Researchers and
their financial backers want to obtain patents and assure their own
money-making capability before disclosing discoveries to potential
competitors.89  Ironically, the commercialization of scientific re-
search, which was prompted by a desire to improve public health, has
encouraged scientists to consider personal profit before public
health."°
Furthermore, introduction of proprietary interests into the research
arena has influenced the types of research performed in the United
States.9" Basic science research, also known as fundamental research,
84. See Claire Turcotte Maatz, Comment, University Physician-Researcher Conflicts of Interest:
The Inadequacy of Current Controls and Proposed Reform, 7 HIGH TECH. LJ. 137, 143 & n.27 (1992)
(describing traditional atmosphere at scientific institutions, which encouraged scientists to
disclose research findings); cf Witt & Gostin, supra note 3, at 548 (declaring that vigor and
openness of science may be undermined by conflicts of interest).
85. See Eisenberg, supra note 23, at 197 (stating that intellectual property law alters
traditional practice of "publication and dedication of research to the public"); Maatz, supra note
84, at 143-50 (describing how scientists used to publish research findings freely for reward of
recognition, but now trend is to focus research efforts in areas that will attract private industry
funding).
86. See Maatz, supra note 84, at 143-46 (describing evolution of rewards in field of medical
research).
87. See Maatz, supra note 84, at 149 (describing today's scientists as "entrepreneurs, seeking
to capitalize on their latest research findings before someone else reaps the profits"); Carey,
supra note 79, at 148 (reporting that some researchers at NIH guard research findings because
they are more interested in commercial values than in sharing results).
88. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Academic Freedom and Academic Values in Sponsored Research, 66
TEX. L. REV. 1363,1375 (1988) (noting that requirement between researchers and sponsors that
research results be kept secret to protect intellectual proprietary rights may conflict with
traditional academic mores that promote dissemination of research findings).
89. See Kathleen Day, Merck to Reveal Findings on Human Genetic Code: Move Stirs Debate over
Research Secrecy, WASH. POST, Sept. 29, 1994, at Bl (describing companies that have withheld
research results pending efforts to turn profit).
90. See Blumenthal, supra note 80, at 3347 (including increased secrecy and damage to
public support for biomedical research as risks of collaborations); cf. SCIENTIFIC MISCONDUCT
REPORT, supra note 3, at 3-6 (noting that many possible reasons may account for scientific fraud
and stating that mostwidely reported cases involved physicians conducting biomedical research).
91. See Boyce Rensberger, Fundamental Research at Risk: PoliticalFavor Shifting Toward Applied
Science, WASH. PosT, Dec. 27, 1994, at Al (identifying recent shift of political and industrial
support for applied research over basic research projects); Witt & Gostin, supra note 3, at 548
(warning that research of public health and research having societal value may be rejected in
favor of personal profit).
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is aimed at discovering new information about the natural world.9"
Fundamental research projects tend not to be profitable immediately,
but instead form the basis for future technology that does prove
financially lucrative." Members of the scientific community are
concerned that some researchers place too much emphasis on
research leading directly to new technologies instead of on fundamen-
tal research.94 Some observers look to the federal government
rather than private entities to take the lead in supporting fundamen-
tal research projects.95
Research motivated by profit or politics96 may be designed
differently and may have different goals than research motivated by
concern about the public health.97 Limited resources mean that not
all research projects can be carried out98 Investors and physicians
with personal financial interests in patents, products, or techniques
may support projects that will be immediately profitable before
projects that will advance science or produce the greatest public
health benefit.9  This trend alarms many scientists who feel that
92. See Rensberger, supra note 91, at Al (explaining difference between basic research
probing "the most intimate workings of the natural world" and applied research promising
immediate results).
93. See Rensberger, supra note 91, atAl (observing that basic science builds knowledge base,
which benefits society in form of improved technologies and medicine). As a result of their
indirect effects, basic science projects are described as the "most misunderstood by the public
and by politicians." Id.
94. J. Michael Bishop et al., Science and the New Administration, 259 SCIENCE 444,445 (1993).
This article, co-authored by Harold Varmus, who is now Director of the National Institutes of
Health, discusses the importance of fundamental research and warns that "[e]nactments of
policies that favor practical applications over basic science . .. [are] likely to come at the
expense of traditional, broadly conceived explorations of biology. ... [This sacrifice would
jeopardize the scientific progress required for social benefits and economic growth in the
future." Id.; f. Rensberger, supra note 91, at A12 (discussing Sen. Barbara Mikulski's comments
emphasizing importance of focusing federal scientific investment around national economic
goals, such as increasing manufacturingjobs).
95. See Bishop et al., supra note 94, at 444 (urging Clinton administration to reverse erosion
of research in United States).
96. See NIH HOUSE REPORT, supra note 6, at 54 (stating that politicization of biomedical
research results in inconsistent funding and imposition of "arbitrary" restrictions on controversial
projects such as fetal-tissue research); see also Eisenberg, supra note 23, at 178 (discussing federal
funding increase of 183% for defense related research compared to 38% for health-related
research in 1980s).
. 97. See Blumenthal, supra note 80, at 3346 (discussing survey in which 30% of Harvard
faculty receiving industry support said their research topics had been influenced by likelihood
of commercial application); cf Donald P. Francis & Donald Kennedy, A Private-Sector AIDS
Vaccine? Don't Hold Your Breath: Free-Market Incentives Are Minimal Only Government Can Take the
Lead, WASH. POST, July 19, 1994, at A21 (letter to editor) (stating that economic disincentives
prevent research sponsors from promoting AIDS vaccine despite desperate need).
98. See Boyce Rensberger, Scientific Ranks Outpace Funds: Imbalance May Put Nation's
Technological Primacy at Risk, WASH. POST, Dec. 25, 1994, at Al, A20 (stating that increased
competition for funding means that fewer basic science proposals are accepted).
99. Cf Francis & Kennedy, supranote 97, atA21 (asserting that pharmaceutical companies
lack financial incentive to develop AIDS vaccine because of low prices, uncertainty, and potential
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progress in applied technologies cannot be achieved without
continuing basic science research. 1' °
Scientists who work in federal institutions are employed by the
American public. As such, government scientists have a greater
obligation to conduct studies with the greatest potential for public
benefit. This distinction is increasingly important as the proportion
of total funding for research projects provided by private sources
continues to rise.'0' Increased private funding for medical research
has raised the quality of research conducted by academic institutions
and private entities and has increased the profit potential for
individual scientists who are employed outside the government.'
Thus, the attractiveness of non-government employment for scientists
has been greatly enhanced.
D. Exodus from Government Service
In contrast to the increased desirability of private employment, the
attractiveness of government service for scientists has decreased, due
in part to regulations such as the honorarium ban in § 501 (b) of the
Ethics Reform Act.0 3 Researchers employed outside the govern-
ment, even those who are supported by federal funds, are not subject
to the ban. Biomedical researchers who choose government service
generally receive much lower salaries than their peers in academia
and private industry." 4 Scientists consider a variety of factors in
deciding whether to conduct research for the government or for a
private entity. Many researchers are willing to accept lower salaries in
exchange for the opportunity to perform research at prestigious
liability).
100. SeeRensberger, supranote 91, atAl (highlighting concerns of scientists about increased
role of politics in decisions about direction of scientific institutes).
101. See Maatz, supra note 84, at 139 n.7 (noting that while total funding for U.S. health
research increased from $7.94 billion in 1980 to $20.57 billion in 1989, overall proportion of
total funding from NIH dropped from 40% to 33%). The difference was attributable to
increased contributions by private industry. Id.
102. See Rick Weiss, NLH Cancer Chief Vents Frustration: Departing BroderDefends Government as
Vital to Scence, WASH. POST, Dec. 24, 1994, at Al, A7 (describing enhanced efficiency of private
research entity and increased salary of researcher who left government service).
103. SeeWeiss, supra note 26, at508 (describing frustration of NIH investigators at not being
able to earn same types of income as private workers).
104. See Modifying the Honoraria Prohibition Hearing, supra note 27, at 18 (statement of Rep.
Morella) ("Many Federal employees accepted honoraria to supplement their income, which...
is, on average, about 28 percent below salaries in the private sector."); see also NIH HOUSE
REPORT, supra note 6, at 54 (concluding that federal salaries have not kept pace with private
sector).
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government entities, such as the NIH's National Cancer Institute
(NCI) .105
Although funding for private research is on the rise, the resources
available to scientists at the NIH remain unparalleled. Government
researchers praise the number of beds for research subjects available
at the NIH and the opportunity that the government entity provides
to move quickly from laboratory findings to clinical studies, which may
benefit patients sooner."0 6 Researchers also note that there is more
freedom and control over research for government employees. 07
As one government scientist stated, "'When you work for a drug
company, you work on their product'.... 'The goal is to get the drug
approved .... [At the NIH] the goals are to find ways of treating can-
cer."
1 08
In the last fifteen years, however, several top researchers have been
lured away from government service.10 For example, in December
1994, Samuel Broder, former director of the NCI, left government
service after twenty-two years to become the chief scientific officer at
a pharmaceutical company."' Broder cited frustration with the
politicization of science and slow bureaucratic action as factors in his
decision to leave the NIH.' In making the move to the private
sector, Broder doubled his government salary'12 If the trend
toward the private sector continues, there will be fewer of the best
biomedical researchers performing the fundamental research projects
that form the foundation for applied future projects."' Progress in
105. See Susan Okie, Scientists Return to NCI's Cutting Edge; Researchers, Citing Unique
Opportunities, Rejoin Cancer Institute, WASH. POST, July 27, 1990, at A25 (citing return of
researchers to NIH because of "unparalleled opportunities" despite lower salaries).
106. Id
107. See id. (citing difficulty getting approval for human studies and problems with insurance
coverage as issues faced by researchers outside government).
108. Id. (quoting Bruce A. Chabner, Director of the Division of Cancer Treatment at the
NCI).
109. See Robin Herman, NIH Genes Researcher Is Leavingfor His Own Lab, WASH. PoST, July 7,
1992, at H4 (describing departure of NIH researcher to start own lab with $70 million venture
capital grant); Weiss, supra note 102, at Al (listing series of departures from NCI, most notably
that of Director Samuel Broder).
110. Weiss, supra note 102, atAl, A7.
111. See Weiss, supra note 102, at A7 (noting Broder's prediction that research at private
company will be more efficient and productive). The article quoted Broder as stating that
"'[t]his company can make decisions in five minutes that would take the government probably
three to four years to make.'" Id.
112. SeeWeiss, supra note 102, atA7 (revealing that Broder's salary increased from $120,000
to between $225,000 and $340,000).
113. SeeRensberger, supra note 91, at Al, A12 (explaining dependence of applied research
on underlying basic science principles and predicting long-term problems in future, such as
finding cures for infectious diseases, if support for basic research is not provided).
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science and technology will slow, as will the economic and health
benefits associated with innovation in these areas.
114
The federal government has become increasingly concerned about
recruitment and retention of scientists."5 The increased politi-
cization of medicine by Congress and special interest groups,"
6
combined with low salaries and stricter regulations,' have dimin-
ished the attractiveness of government jobs. Moreover, scientists
employed outside the government are subject to conflict of interest
restrictions similar to those imposed by the Office of Government
Ethics (OGE)," 8 but are not subject to the honorarium ban. The
honorarium prohibition further decreases the attractiveness of
government service for scientists." 9 If the government continues to
subject its researchers to unnecessary restrictions that do not affect
their counterparts in private industry and academia, agencies with
scientific missions, such as the NIH, will have increasing difficulty in
attracting and retaining the most productive and efficient scientists.
II. ETHICS REFORM ACr OF 1989
Congress amended the Ethics in Government Act 20 in 1989 with
the Ethics Reform Act. 2' The amendments included imposition of
a ban on receipt of honoraria by all federal employees. 22 Although
the honoraria prohibition contained in the Ethics Reform Act affects
all federal employees, the ban was motivated by concern about wide-
spread acceptance of honoraria by members of the legislative
branch.'2
114. See 15 U.S.C. § 3701 (1994) (listing benefits of technological and industrial discoveries
including better living standards, improved public services, increased productivity, newjobs, and
better competitiveness for U.S. products).
115. See NIH HOUSE REPORT, supra note 6, at 54.
116. SeeWeiss, supranote 102, atA7 (describing difficult decision of NCI chief to leave NIH
due to frustration with increased politicization of research, particularly in areas of AIDS and
cancer).
117. See Weiss, supra note 26, at 508 (noting that honorarium ban prohibited government
scientists from accepting "'small but significant supplementary income'" (quoting Stuart
Aaronson, Chief, NCI, Laboratory of Cellular and Molecular Biology)).
118. Cf. National Science Foundation, 45 C.F.R. § 683.32(b) (1995) (allowing recipients of
NSF funds who are not government employees to accept honoraria while not on official duty).
119. See supra Parts IA, .C (explaining importance of honoraria for scientists and
recruitment problems for government institutes with scientific missions).
120. Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824 (codified as
amended at various sections of Tities 2, 5, 18, and 28 of the U.S.C. (1994)).
121. Ethics Reform Act of 1989, Pub. L No. 101-94, 103 Stat. 1716 (codified in scattered
sections of 5 U.S.C. (1994)).
122. 5 U.S.C. app. § 501(b) (1994).
123. Modifying the Honoraria Prohibition Hearing; supra note 27, at 20 (statement of Rep.
Morella); see also BiPARTISAN TASK FORcE REPORT, supra note 11, at H9256 (noting that members
of Congress earned almost $10 million in honoraria before ban).
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At the time that Congress passed the Ethics Reform Act, existing
executive branch ethics regulations were much stricter than ethics
regulations for the legislative and judicial branches." 4 In addition,
a contemporaneous salary increase was granted for federal employees
in all three branches who had been supplementing their government
income with honoraria." No pay increase was given to rank and
file executive branch employees.
126
Thus, Congress seems to have imposed the honoraria prohibition
on unappointed members of the executive branch as a means to
achieve uniformity and to ease administrative burdens rather than as
a directed effort to impose stricter regulations on these employ-
ees.12 7  Unfortunately, government scientists became unintended
casualties of this prohibition. Congress subjected government
scientists to standards appropriate for legislators rather than treating
federal scientists like their peers in academia and private industry.
A. Honorarium Ban Intended for Members of Congress
Members of Congress' practice of receiving honoraria provided the
impetus for § 501 (b) of the Ethics Reform Act. 2  Before passage
of the 1989 Act, different ethics standards governed employees of
each of the three branches.2 9 Standards for the legislative branch
were the least restrictive,"s° allowing members of Congress collective-
ly to earn almost ten million dollars in fees for speaking engagements
124. See infra Part H .1 (describing executive branch regulations in effect when Ethics
Reform Act passed).
125. 5 U.S.C. § 5318 (note) (1994).
126. See2 U.S.C. § 31-1 (note) (1994) (making honorarium ban contingent on not repealing
salary increase).
127. See Statement on Signing the Ethics Reform Act of 1989, PUB. PAPERS 1613 (stating that
equitable application of ethics restrictions to three branches is desirable reform). But see
Thomas D. Morgan, The Quest for Equality in Regulating the Behavior of Government Offcials: The
Case of Extrajudicial Compensation, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 488, 488-89 (1990) (arguing that
different ethical considerations arise from situations presented to members of different branches
of government). Professor Morgan focuses on the costs of treating judges like members of
Congress for the purpose of ethics regulations and concludes that judges and legal education
suffer from this treatment, which does not produce a corresponding gain to the public. Id. at
489.
128. United States v. NTEU, 115 S. Ct. 1003, 1014 (1995) (noting that receipt of honoraria
by lawmakers motivated ban); see also Modifying the Honoraria Prohibition Hearing, supra note 27,
at 20 (statement of Rep. Morella) (differentiating acceptability of broad honorarium ban
between members of Congress and rank and file federal employees).'
129. See infra Part IIA.1 (describing pre-1989 differences in ethics standards).
130. See COMMISSION ON ExEcUTvE, LEGISLATIVE, ANDJUDICIAL SALARIES, FAIRNESS FOR OUR
PUBUC SERVANTS 24 (1988) [hereinafter QUADRENNIAL COMMISSION REPORT] (reporting that less
stringent standards of conduct for legislators allowed them to accept significant amounts of
outside income).
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and publications in 1987 alone."3 ' In passing the Act, Congress
recognized the role of honoraria as salary supplements and made the
honorarium ban contingent on a significant salary increase for top
employees of each branch. 2 The ban extended to career executive
branch employees, although they did not receive offsetting salary
increases.1 33  Career executive branch employees were already
subject to limits on outside earned income, and there were no reports
of impropriety by these individuals." 4
1. Regulations in effect prior to passage of the Ethics Reform Act
Prior to the passage of the Ethics Reform Act, members of the
executive branch were subject to more stringent restrictions on
outside income than members of the legislative or judicial branch-
es."3 Existing legislation held employees of all three branches to
a $2000 limit per individual activity.3 ' Executive branch employees
at or above the GS-16 pay level, however, were also precluded from
earning an aggregate amount of outside income, including honoraria,
greater than fifteen percent of their federal salaries, 37 while mem-
bers of the House of Representatives could earn as much as thirty
percent of their salaries from outside income," 8 and Senators could
receive up to forty percent of their salaries for outside activities.3 9
Members of the judiciary had no maximum percentage of salary
restrictions for outside income." Additionally, only executive
branch employees could face criminal liability for acceptance of
131. SeeBIPARTISAN TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 11, at H9256-57 (stating that $9.8 million
was aggregate amount of honoraria received by members of Congress in 1987).
132. See discussion infra Part IIA3 (explaining relationship of pay raise to honoraria
prohibition).
133. See infra Part IIA3 (discussing inconsistency between pay raise, which only applied to
lawmakers and political appointees, and honorarium ban, which applied to all government
employees).
134. See NTEU, 115 S. Ct. at 1009 (noting that honoraria ban was extended to career
executive branch employees without evidence of problems caused by receipt of honoraria by
them).
135. See QUADRENNIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 130, at 346 (summarizing ethics
regulations for each branch); Modfying the Honoraria Prohibition Hearing, supra note 27, at 71-73
(statement of Stephen D. Potts, Director, Office of Government Ethics) (describing regulations
in place at passage of honoraria prohibition).
136. Federal Election Campaign ActAmendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283, § 328, 90 Stat.
475, 494, repealed byAct of Aug. 14, 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-90, § 6(d), 105 Stat. 447,451 (codified
at 2 U.S.C. § 441(i) (1994)).
137. BIPARTISAN TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 11, at H9256.
138. RuLEs OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, RULE XLVII, H.R. DOc. NO. 279, 99th Cong.,
2d Sess. 722 (1986).
139. BIPARTISAN TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 11, at H9256.
140. CODE OFJUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 6 (1972) (allowingjudges to accept compensation
for quasi-judicial and extrajudicial activities that do not give appearance of impropriety).
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compensation from outside sources for services performed in the
scope of their positions as government employees.14'
Prior to passage of the Ethics Reform Act, the OGE applied a five-
part test to determine whether a member of the executive branch
could accept honoraria." The five-part test identified circumstanc-
es that might create a conflict of interest for the executive branch
employee. The OGE test was as follows:
(1) Is the honorarium offered for carrying out government duties
for an activity that focuses specifically on the employing agency's
responsibilities, policies and programs?
(2) Is the honorarium offered to the government employee or
family member because of the official position held by the
employee?
(3) Is the honorarium offered because of the government informa-
tion that is being imparted?
(4) Is the honorarium offered by someone who does business with
or wishes to do business with the employee in his or her official
capacity?
(5) Were any government resources or time used by the employee
to produce the materials for the article or speech or make the
appearance?
4 3
If the employee answered these five questions in the negative, the
employee could accept honorarium of $2000 or less."
If a presentation or publication included information about a
government agency's activities or disclosed information that had not
yet been made public, the employee could not accept the honorari-
um. "  The OGE also questioned the source of the compensa-
tion.'46 A potential conflict of interest arose when an entity or
individual that was doing business or was likely to do business with the
executive branch employee in his or her official capacity offered
payment to the government employee. 47 Thus, executive branch
employees were prohibited from accepting honoraria under circum-
141. 18 U.S.C. § 209(a) (1994).
142. Modifying the Honoraria Prohibition Hearing, supra note 27, at 72 (statement of Stephen
D. Potts) (setting out test, which was valid until Jan. 1, 1991, for receipt of honoraria).
143. Modifying the Honoraria Prohibition Hearing, supra note 27, at 72 (statement of Stephen
D. Potts); see also NTEU v. United States, 990 F.2d 1271, 1276-77 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (noting that
application of this standard did not result in administrative difficulties), afrd in part, rev'd in par,
115 S. Ct. 1003 (1995).
144. Modifying the Honoraria Prohibition Hearing, supra note 27, at 72.
145. Modifying the Honoraria Prohibition Hearing, supra note 27, at 72.
146. Modifying the Honoraria Prohibition Hearing, supra note 27, at 72.
147. Modifying the Honoraria Prohibition Hearing, supra note 27, at 72.
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stances that could give rise to either actual or apparent conflicts of
interest.'48
When the honorarium prohibition imposed by the Ethics Reform
Act went into effect in 1991, it added an additional layer of regulation
for executive branch employees. 49 In contrast to the extensive
ethics regulations in place for members of the executive branch in
1989, members of the legislative branch enjoyed greater freedom.' 0
Concern about the amount of honoraria accepted by members of
Congress prompted creation of several Commissions to study the
issue.
2. Ethics commission findings and recommendations
On February 2, 1989, congressional leaders appointed the Biparti-
san Task Force on Ethics.' This assemblage of Democratic and
Republican members of Congress met weekly throughout much of the
year and held four public hearings.1 2  The Task Force report
provided the basis for the Ethics Reform Act of 1989, including the
honorarium prohibition.'53 The Task Force relied on reports by the
Commission on Executive, Legislative, andJudicial Salaries (Quadren-
nial Commission) and the President's Commission on Federal
Ethics Law Reform (Wilkey Commission). 5 Both the Quadrennial
Commission and the Wilkey Commission reported that members of
Congress were more likely than members of the other branches to
148. Modifying the Honoraria Prohibition Hearing, supra note 27, at 73.
149. See Modifying the Honoraria Prohibition Hearing, supra note 27, at 73 (statement of Stephen
D. Potts) (describing additional ethics restrictions as "a layer that, in ourjudgment imposes too
great a burden on the vast majority of government employees and is unnecessary to protect the
government from unethical conduct").
150. See QUADRENNIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 130, at 24, 36 (noting that legislation
regulating outside income favored Congress over executive andjudicial branches); Modifying the
Honoraria Prohibition Hearing, supra note 27, at 71 (noting that executive branch employees were
always subject to honoraria regulations whereas legislative andjudicial branch employees were
not).
151. See BIPARTISAN TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 11, at H9253 (citing task force goal to
restore public confidence and promote integrity of government officials).
152. BIPARTISAN TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 11, at H9253.
153. See 5 U.S.C. app. § 501(b) (1994) (providing text of Ethic Reform Act's honorarium
prohibition); see also BIPARTISAN TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 11, at 14-16 (setting forth
recommendations for honoraria and outside earned income).
154. See generally QUADRENNIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 130 (reporting 1989
Quadrennial Commission's recommendations dealing with adjustments in governmental salaries
and Congress' ban on honoraria for members of all three branches of government).
155. See generally PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON FEDERAL ETHICS LAW REFoRM, To SERVE WITH
HONOR: REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON FEDERAL ETHICS LAW REFORM (1989)
[hereinafter WILKEY COMMISSION REPORT] (setting forth recommendations for ethics reform in
all branches of government with emphasis on conflicts of interest and salary augmentation
through gifts, honoraria, and outside employment).
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supplement their government salaries with honoraria. 156  Despite
their focus on acceptance of honoraria in Congress, however, both
Commissions recommended banning receipt of honoraria in all three
branches.
15 7
It is interesting to note that these Commissions employed a more
limited definition of honoraria than that adopted by the Ethics
Reform Act. Section 501 (b) of the Ethics Reform Act states that
"[a] n individual may not receive any honorarium while" employed by
the government for an "appearance, speech, or article." 58  Both
Commissions defined honoraria as "payments for public appearances
to deliver a talk or engage in a colloquy at the invitation of some non-
governmental group."'-9 Thus, the Commissions' reports may have
intended their recommendations to apply exclusively to oral activi-
ties.1
60
The Wilkey Commission Report regarded compensation for writing
scholarly articles, teaching academic courses, and publishing texts as
outside earned income rather than honoraria. 6 1 Neither Commis-
sion suggested that all outside earned income should be prohibit-
ed. 2 In fact, the Wilkey Commission specifically recommended
that the President be given authority to grant exemptions for extra-
156. QUADRENNIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 130, at 23 (finding that members of
Congress have unique job responsibilities which necessitate supplementing salaries with outside
income); WILKEY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 155, at 35 (describing lack of uniformity in
regulations and desire to "alleviate[] abuses in the legislative branch").
157. QUADRENNIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 130, at 3, 24; WILKEY COMMISSION
REPORT, supra note 155, at 35.
158. 5 U.S.C. app. § 503(3) (1994).
159. QUADRENNIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 130, at 24; see aiw WILKEY COMMISSION
REPORT, supra note 155, at 35 (adopting Quadrennial Commission definition).
160. But seeWILKEY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 155, at 36 (recognizing that ban should
be broad enough to close "loopholes such as receipt of consulting, professional, or similar fees;
... or any other benefit that is the substantial equivalent of an honorarium").
161. WILKEY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 155, at 37. The Wilkey Commission Report
recommended a maximum limit on outside earned income, but did not propose a flat
prohibition on outside earnings forall government employees. Id. at 33. Commission members
identified "categories of outside activity that neither interfere with the full performance of
,official duties nor pose significant ethical issues." Id. at 36. While the Wilkey Commission
expressed concern that outside activities could "take time and energy away from official
activities," it also acknowledged that activities such as writing scholarly articles could "benefit
both the federal employees and society at large." Id. at 37.
162. See QUADRENNIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 130, at 25 (recommending that
restrictions be placed on all senior federal officials to prohibit outside income that conflicts or
appears to conflict with ofkidal duties); WILKEY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 155, at 36
(stating that limits on outside income should not be unnecessarily restrictive). Instead of
endorsing a fiat ban on extra-employment compensation, the Wilkey Commission recommended
prohibiting outside earned income for activities or services that conflict or appear to conflict
with the performance of official duties. WILKEY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 155, at 35-36.
THE AMERICAN UNIVSITY LAw REVIEW [Vol. 45:885
employment activities "that neither interfere with the full perfor-
mance of official duties nor pose significant ethical issues."'
63
Both the Quadrennial Commission and the Wilkey Commission
further found that top officials in all three branches of the federal
government were not adequately compensated.1" Apparently, low
government salaries were exacerbating recruitment and retention
problems for federal agencies and institutions."6 The Quadrennial
Commission blamed inadequate government salaries for the practice
of supplementing income through honoraria."6  In conjunction
with the recommendation to prohibit honoraria, the Quadrennial
Commission recommended significant salary increases for senior
members of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches.
167
3. Contemporaneous salary increase
Relying on the Quadrennial Commission report and in recognition
of the value of honoraria payments as supplements to low government
salaries, Congress offset the honorarium ban with substantial pay
raises for members of Congress, judges, and politically appointed
members of the executive branch.16 Congress ensured that, if the
provision granting these substantial pay raises were ever repealed,
§ 501 (b) would cease to be effective. 69 The contingency of
§ 501 (b) on significant salary increases for these discrete groups of
government employees indicated recognition by Congress that these
groups would be affected financially by the newly imposed honoraria
prohibition.7 '
163. WILKEY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 155, at 36.
164. QUADRENNIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 130, at 15 (noting that "top federal
officials are paid substantially less than high officials in other public and private nonprofit
organizations"); WILKEY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 155, at 37-38 (suggesting that salaries
should be adjusted to "offset the past erosion" in real wages caused by inflation).
165. See QUADRENNIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 130, at 1, 27-28 (noting that federal
judges increasingly resign from "lifetime" appointments and average tenure for top executive
branch officials is 18 months).
166. QUADRENNIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 130, at 24.
167. QUADRENNIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 130, at 3, 24. The Quadrennial
Commission recommended that the President design the 1990 budget request to reflect salary
increases for senior members of all federal branches to approximate in constant dollars the
relevant salaries from 1969. Id. at 3. The Commission believed that raising salaries to a level
that would enable federal officials to meet "minimum family obligations" would undercut
attempts tojustifi receipt of honoraria as needed income. Id. at 24.
168. Ethics Reform Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-194, § 703, 103 Stat. 1716, 1763 (codified
at 5 U.S.C. app. § 501 (1994)) (granting 25% pay raise).
169. Id.
170. SeeNTEU v. United States, 990 F.2d 1271, 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (labeling "sharp" salary
increases for members of Congress as one "key ingredient" in passage of honoraria prohibition),
aft'd in parl, rev'd in part, 115 S. Ct. 1003 (1995).
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In the executive branch, only high-ranking, political appointees
received these pay increases;17 1 other members of the executive
branch were subject to the ban on receipt of honoraria without
receiving supplemental salary increases. 72 The non-competitive
salary issues identified by the ethics Commissions' reports, however,
were not restricted to top government officials. 73  Salaries for
government scientists, for example, have not kept pace with those of
scientists in the private sector. 4 For many scientists, therefore, the
honoraria prohibition has contributed to the maintenance of
inadequate salaries and excessive limits on outside earned income,
making public service unattractive to distinguished scientists. Such a
result does not serve the purpose of ethics legislation. Employees of
all three branches of government are public servants and should be
held to high ethical standards." Nothing in this premise, however,
requires the three branches of government, with their diverse
functions and duties, to be controlled by identical regulations. 6
B. National Treasury Employees Union Class Action
In response to the honorarium ban, a class of executive branch
employees below the rank of GS-16 filed suit seeking to enjoin
enforcement of § 501 (b) of the Ethics Reform Act as a violation of
their First Amendment rights. 7 Most of the plaintiffs were execu-
tive branch employees who wrote or spoke about subjects unrelated
to their positions with the government.7 Plaintiffs included a
171. Pub. L. No. 101-194, § 703(a), 103 Stat. 1716, 1768 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 5318 (note)
(1994)).
172. See i&. (stating that basic pay only for appointed positions in Executive Schedule shall
be increased by 25% and rounded to nearest multiple of 100).
173. See supra notes 109-19 and accompanying text (explaining consequences of inadequate
government salaries for scientists).
174. See NIH HOUSE REPORT, supra note 6, at 54 (citing non-competitive salaries as
impediment to recruitment and retention of scientific personnel); QUADRENNIAL COMMISSION
REPORT, supra note 130, at 20 (discussing problem of competitive salaries for NIH scientists).
175. See Modifying the Honoraria Prohibition Hearing, supra note 27, at 91 (statement of Fred
Wertheimer, President, Common Cause) (asserting that public servants have duty to act in
interests of general public).
176. Cf. NTEU v. United States, 990 F.2d 1271, 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (asserting that private
parties paying for speech or writing have greater expectation to influence Congress than to
influence executive branch employees), af/'d in part, revd in par4 115 S. Ct. 1003 (1995);
Morgan, supra note 127, at 488-89 (arguing that different ethical issues are presented for
members of each branch who receive outside income).
177. NTEU v. United States, 788 F. Supp. 4,6 (D.D.C. 1992), affd 990 F.2d 1271 (D.C. Cir.
1993), affd in par4 reu'd in part; 115 S. Ct. 1003 (1995).
178. i& at 6 n.1. One plaintiff, Richard Deutsch, is a business analyst for the government
who engages in outside activities that also involve business analysis. Joint Appendix at 42a-46a,
United States v. NTEU, 115 S. Ct. 1003 (1995) (No. 93-1170) (declaration of Richard Deutsch).
For further discussion of this plaintiff, see infra text accompanying notes 219-23.
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Nuclear Regulatory Commission lawyer who authored articles about
Russian history, a postal worker who spoke and wrote about 'the
Quaker religion, and a Health and Human Services employee who
wrote arts and theater reviews for newspapers.179 Plaintiffs argued
that the honorarium prohibition violated the First Amendment by
denying them compensation for their extra-employment activities. °
On February 22, 1995, the Supreme Court decided United States v.
National Treasury Employees Union (NTEU).'8 ' Writing for the majori-
ty, Justice Stevens recognized that payment provides a "significant
incentive" to engage in expressive activity.112 The Court noted that
plaintiffs' status as government employees effectively denied them the
right to this incentive.8 3  Although the Court found the
government's interest in integrity and efficiency to be "vital,"18 it
held that the honorarium ban was not sufficiently narrowly tailored
to survive a First Amendment challenge by these plaintiffs.'1
Justice Stevens recognized the powerful government interest in
preventing actual or apparent impropriety by federal employees.
1 86
Yet, he found that this interest was not strong enough to outweigh the
interests of federal employees in exercising their First Amendment
rights and the interests of potential audiences in hearing them.8 7
1. The Pickering balance
In finding application of the honorarium ban to career executive
branch employees unconstitutional, the Court in NTEU applied a
balancing test that it had developed in Pickering v. Board of Educa-
tion,"ta which also involved restrictions on the First Amendment
rights of government employees. In Pickering, the Court balanced the
individual's interest in speaking about matters of public concern
against the government's interest in efficient performance of the
179. NTEU 990 F.2d at 1275.
180. NTEU, 115 S. Ct. at 1010.
181. 115 S. Ct. 1003 (1995); see alsoJoan Biskupic,Justiee Question Honoraria Ban: Limits on
Federal Workers' Speech COitiized in Oral Arguments, WASH. PosT, Nov. 9, 1994, at A4 (describing
spirited oral arguments).
182. United States v. NTEU, 115 S. Ct. 1003, 1014 (1995).
183. Id. (stating that denial of honoraria induces individuals to "curtail their expression" in
order to maintain employment with government).
184. Id at 1016.
185. Id. at 1018.
186. See id. at 1015-16 ("The Government's concern is that federal officers not misuse or
appear to misuse power by accepting compensation for their unofficial and nonpolitical writing
and speaking activities. This interest is undeniably powerful .... ").
187. Id. at 1018 ("[T]he speculative benefits the honorarium ban may provide the
Government are not sufficient to justify this crudely crafted burden on respondents' freedom
to engage in expressive activities.").
188. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
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services entrusted to its employees. 89 Because NTEU involved a
broad prophylactic ban rather than an after-the-fact disciplinary
action,Justice Stevens modified this balancing equation to address the
particular facts in NTEU.' Due to the honorarium ban's broad
preemptive chilling of a vast amount of speech,' 9 ' the Court found
that the government faced a greater burden than in Pickering.92
The broad scope of § 501 (b) required that the government's interest
overcome the interests of both executive branch employees and their
potential audiences.'93
In assessing the weight of the executive branch employees' interests
and those of their potential audiences, the Court began by noting
that § 501 (b) would have affected the work of several "literary
giants."'194  Justice Stevens noted that Nathaniel Hawthorne,
195
Herman Melville, 19 and Walt Whitman 97 were all government
employees. Each of these men contributed significantly to the
"marketplace of ideas" through their expressive activities. 9 Justice
Stevens factored into the Pickeing balance the potential for the
honorarium ban to stifle the next Hawthorne, Melville, or Whit-
man.'9 The risk of losing contributions from the next government-
employed literary giant created a large burden for the government to
overcome in justifying the ban on honoraria."0
The Court also noted that § 501 (b) did not technically prohibit any
expressive activity."' The ban applied only to compensation for such
189. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). The Picketing balance test has
been employed throughout the Supreme Court's jurisprudence. SeeWaters v. Churchill, 114 S.
Ct. 1878, 1890 (1994) (holding that potential disruptiveness of fired employee's statements
outweighed their First Amendment value); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 150-51 (1983)
(applying Pickeringbalancing test to invalidate discharge of employee because First Amendment
interests outweighed governmental interests of efficiency, integrity, and discipline).
190. See NTEU, 115 S. Ct. at 1014 ("The widespread impact of the Honoraria ban ... gives
rise to far more serious concerns than could any single supervisory decision.").
191. See id at 1013 (describing honorarium ban as "Congress' wholesale deterrent to abroad
category of expression by a massive number of potential speakers").
192. Id. at 1014 (finding that broad speech restrictions is more onerous than isolated
disciplinary actions).
193. Id. (finding that application of ban to low level executive branch employees did not
further ban's goal of reducing undue influence).
194. Id. at 1012.
195. Id. (noting Hawthorne's employment with Customs Service).
196. Id. (adding that Melville also worked for Customs Service).
197. Id. (listing Whitman as employee of both Departments ofJustice and Interior).
198. Id.
199. Id. at 1015 ("[W]e cannot ignore the risk that [the ban] might deprive us of the work
of a future Melville or Hawthorne.").
200. See id. at 1014-15 (finding that ban imposes immeasurable costs with regard to right of
public to hear and read words of governmental employees, thereby violating First Amendment).
201. Id. at 1014 (conceding that § 501(b) does not prohibit speech or discriminate among
speakers based on content or viewpoint of messages); see also id. at 1029 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
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expressive activities; therefore, despite the ban, government employ-
ees remained free to engage in expressive activities as long as they did
not receive compensation. 2  In addressing this distinction, the
Court cited Simon & Schuster v. New York State Crime Victims Board.2 °3
In that case, the Supreme Court invalidated a state's "Son of Sam"
law, which restricted the ability of criminals to receive compensation
for expression regarding their crimes.
204
In Simon & Schuster, the Court found that a financial burden alone
was enough to create a First Amendment violation.2°5  Accordingly,
the Court in NTEU held that the honorarium ban infringed on the
First Amendment rights of low and mid-level executive branch
employees by deterring expressive activity.
206
In Pickering, the Court had distinguished between the interests of
the government when acting as an employer and its interests as a
207sovereign. The government's interest in regulating the activities
of its employees is stronger than its interest in regulating the activities
of the general public.08 In administering § 501 (b), the government
functions as an employer because only government employees are
prohibited from accepting honoraria.2°
In NTEU, the Court recognized the government's vital interest in
efficiently regulating the ethical conduct of its employees.2 10  The
Court noted the concern that "federal officers not misuse or appear
to misuse power by accepting compensation for their unofficial"
dissenting) ("[U]nlike our prototypical application of Pickering which normally involves a
response to the content of employee speech, the honoraria ban prohibits no speech and is
unrelated to the message or the viewpoint expressed by a government employee.")
202. See id. at 1024 (Rehnquist, Cj., dissenting) (accusing Court of overstating burden to
particularly sympathetic plaintiffs in order to set stage for broader than necessary remedy).
203. 502 U.S. 105 (1991), cited in NTEU, 115 S. Ct. at 1014.
204. Simon & Schuster v. New York State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 109 (1991).
205. Id. at 115 (restating "engrained" principle that statute is presumptively violative of First
Amendment if it imposes financial burden on speakers based on speech's content).
206. NTEU, 115 S. Ct. at 1014; cf ii at 1014 n.14 ("'No man but a blockhead ever wrote,
except for money.'" (quotingJ. BOsWELL, LFE OF SAMUELJOHNSON LL.D 302 (R. Hutchins ed.,
1952))).
207. Pickeringv. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) ("[1]t cannot be gainsaid that the
State has interests as an employer in regulating the speech of its employees that differ
significantly from those it possesses in connection with regulation of the speech of the citizenry
in general."). Subsequent Supreme Court case law clarifies this distinction. In 1994, the Court
declared that the government's interest in efficient achievement of its goals "is elevated from
a relatively subordinate interest when it acts as sovereign to a significant one when it acts as
employer." Waters v. Churchill, 114 S. Ct. 1878, 1888 (1994).
208. See NTEU, 115 S. Ct. at 1012 (describing increased ability of Congress to restrain speech
of individuals employed in government service).
209. Id.
210. See id. at 1016 (describing government reliance on avoidance of administrative costs of
detecting violations by lower-level employees as justification for flat ban).
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speeches and writing.2 1' In furtherance of this interest, however,
Congress sought to restrict the behavior of all government employees,
even executive branch employees for whom there had been no
evidence of impropriety.2 The Court noted the influence of the
Quadrennial Commission and Wilkey Commission reports on
Congress' passage of the honorarium prohibition. 13 These reports
recommended an across-the-board ban on honoraria, but cited no
instances of "misconduct related to honoraria" among rank and file
executive branch employees. 4
The Court also discussed the absence of a requirement that
government employees' expressive activities relate to their jobs.1 5
Without this nexus requirement, § 501 (b) banned speech that would
not create even the appearance of impropriety by government
employees .2 1  Thus, the Court held that Congress did not narrowly
tailor the honorarium ban to meet the government's needs.1 In
holding that the ban was unconstitutional as written, the majority of
the Court chose not to impose its own nexus requirement or to limit
the decision to executive branch employees who engage in activities
unrelated to their jobs. 8
2. Expressive activities that relate to government employment
In NTEU, the Supreme Court did not decide whether the honorari-
um ban may constitutionally be applied to individuals whose
expressive activities bear a relationship to their government employ-
ment. One of the plaintiffs in the NTEU case, Richard Deutsch,
acknowledged a nexus between his position as a business editor for
the Voice of America and his freelance business writing219 In the
211. Id. at 1015.
212. See id. (concluding that Congress could not reasonably extend presumption of
impropriety by members of Congress to all federal employees).
213. See id. at 1009 (detailing Commissions' findings of potential impropriety in acceptance
of honoraria by legislators).
214. Id at 1016.
215. See id. at 1015 (finding that government could not claim workplace disruption because
speech did not relate to employment duties).
216. Id. at 1017.
217. Id- at 1019.
218. Seeid. (discussing desire to avoid "judicial legislation" and uncertainty about how to craft
nexus requirement). But see id. at 1022 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (recommending expansion of nexus requirement for series of activities to prohibit even
single expression if related to government employment).
219. NTEU v. United States, 990 F.2d 1271, 1283 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1993), aff'd inpart, rev'd in
part, 115 S. Ct. 1003 (1995). Deutsch states that he was hired by Voice of America, in part,
because of the "expertise demonstrated by articles [he] had written." Joint Appendix at 43a,
United States v. NTEU, 115 S. Ct. 1003 (1995) (No. 93-1170) (declaration of Richard Deutsch).
Voice of America also assured him that he could continue to publish articles while he worked
for the government and "in fact, encouraged [him] to publish because this might add prestige
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opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit, Judge Williams noted Deutsch's assertion that the
prohibition against compensation for writing and speaking will reduce
the likelihood that "hard-working, intelligent, creative persons"220
will choose government service.221  But Judge Williams did not
factor Deutsch's assertions into the Pickering balance.
AlthoughJudge Williams assumed arguendo that § 501 (b) could be
applied to Deutsch without violating the Constitution,222 the Su-
preme Court left this question open. The majority did not decide
whether the statute would be constitutional if a nexus existed between
the employee's job and the activity for which the employee received
honoraria.21 In Sanjour v. E.PA.,224 decided three months after
NTEU, the D.C. Circuit came closer to addressing the nexus issue.
In Sanjour, the D.C. Circuit invalidated ethics regulations prohibit-
ing government employees from being reimbursed by private parties
for travel expenses incurred for unofficial speaking engagements. 221
The regulation at issue in Sanjour imposed a greater burden on
employees than the honorarium ban in § 501(b) because § 501 (b)
allows employees to recover necessary travel expenses. 22 Moreover,
the distinction made by the regulation in Sanjour was between
"official" and "unofficial" speaking engagements.227 The subject
matter of the speech and its relationship to the government employ-
eesjob was not directly at issue in Sanjour.
Nevertheless, the government's assertions and the court's analysis
in Sanjour are relevant to the distinction between speeches or articles
that relate to government employment and those that are unrelated.
The government initially asserted two interests in support of the
regulations. First, the regulations protect against the "appearance of
impropriety" that could result from a government employee accepting
reimbursement from a private party to whom the employee might
to the agency." Id.
220. NTEU, 990 F.2d at 1276.
221. After hearing the plaintiff's argument that prohibiting private compensation would
decrease the attractiveness of government serviceJudge Williams stated, "Surely this is so." Id.
222. Id
223. See NTEU, 115 S. Ct. at 1019 (stating that addition of nexus requirement to ban "would
likely raise independent constitutional concerns whose adjudication is unnecessary to decide this
case").
224. 56 F.3d 85 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
225. Sanjour v. E.PA, 56 F.3d 85, 87-88 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
226. Id. at 93-94; see also 5 U.S.C. app. § 505(3) (1994) (allowing receipt of "actual and
necessary travel expenses").
227. Sanjour, 56 F.3d at 90. Under the E.PA ethics regulation, government employees could
receive "travel and accommodation reimbursement for 'official' or 'authorized' speaking,
writing, or teaching engagements, but not for activities the agency does not pre-approve." Id.
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then "appear beholden" and "prone to provide illicit regulatory
'favors' in return."228 The D.C. Circuit noted that the government
wisely abandoned this assertion because the "appearance of impropri-
ety" bore no relation to the distinction between official and unofficial
speech made by the regulation. 29
Second, the government asserted that reimbursement to govern-
ment employees from private entities would make it appear that the
employees were "'selling' their labor twice."2"0  The government
argued that this practice might cause the public to question "the
single minded dedication of government employees to the public
interest."2" The court found that the scope of the regulations did
not fit the government's asserted interests. 32
Of primary importance to the court in Sanjourwas the fact that the
distinction between official and unofficial speech made the govern-
ment regulation underinclusive. 3  The regulation was under-
inclusive because recovery of expenses from a private party for official
speech raised the same concerns that the government identified for
unofficial speech.21 The court noted that the regulation was also
overinclusive because the public could not construe receipt of
minimal expenses, such as a bus ticket, as "using public office for
private 'gain.'" '  Yet, recovery of minimal expenses would be
barred by the regulation along with receipt of extravagant expens-
es.2
3 6
Similarly, limiting the honorarium ban to expressive activities that
have a nexus to government employment and allowing honoraria for
those that do not, would make § 501(b) both underinclusive and
overinclusive. If a scientist conducts research on the efficacy of a
particular drug, there is little difference between the manufacturer of
the drug paying the scientist to speak about the research or about a
wholly unrelated topic. It is natural for manufacturers to want to
provide an incentive to a scientist who will speak favorably about their
products. The concern is that the scientist will be induced to
fabricate positive results in return for payment from the manufactur-
er.
228. Id at 94.
229. I
230. I&




235. Id at 97-98.
236. Id at 98.
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But the concern about impropriety is not related to the subject of
a particular speech or article. If this were true, drug manufacturers
could easily subvert the regulation by paying honorarium to a scientist
only for a speech about an unrelated topic, and not paying for a
glowing article about the payor's product by the same scientist. Like
travel expenses, concern about payment of honoraria hinges on either
the payor's interest in the government employee's work or fear that
scientists will be distracted from dedication to the public interest.
Neither of these concerns is addressed by imposing a nexus require-
ment into the honorarium ban in § 501 (b). As stated in Sanjour, the
dangers "derive[d] from the private source's interest in the future
actions of the employee's agency"" 7 rather than the distinctions
between either official and unofficial or related and unrelated speech.
Despite the assertion that a nexus requirement is unnecessary and
unhelpful, it continues to appeal to members of the Supreme Court
and Congress.
I1. MODYING THE HONORARIUM BAN TO INCLUDE A NEXUS
REQUIREMENT
Since passage of the Ethics Reform Act, Congress has successfully
added two nexus requirements, one for a series of expressions,
23
and one for Department of Defense employees. 9 In addition,
several other nexus requirements have been proposed but not
enacted .2' Although the decision in NTEU enjoined application of
the honorarium ban to government scientists below GS-16,241 the
ban still applies to many scientists, and by adding a new nexus
requirement to the Act, Congress could presumably cure the
constitutional deficiency with respect to all government scientists .
42
A nexus requirement that does not expressly exempt scientists or take
their special needs into account would again place government
scientists at a disadvantage relative to their peers in non-government
positions.
243
237. Id. at 94.
238. 5 U.S.C. app. § 505(3) (1994).
239. 10 U.S.C. § 2161 (1994).
240. See infra Part III.C (describing 1991 and 1993 legislation).
241. NTEU, 115 S. Ct. at 1018-19 (granting relief to all executive branch employees below
GS-16 pay scale).
242. SeeNTEU v. United States, 990 F.2d 1271,1276-77 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (assuming ban could
be constitutionally applied if nexus was present), affld in part, re'd in part, 115 S. Ct. 1003
(1995).
243. See supra Part .C (discussing problems created by honorarium ban for government
scientists).
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A. Nexus Requirement for a Series of Expressive Activities
In 1992, Congress amended § 505(3) of the Ethics Reform Act.2'
Congress expanded the definition of honorarium by including a
nexus requirement for a series of expressive activities. The new
definition of honorarium is
a payment of money or any thing of value for an appearance,
speech or article (including a series of appearances, speeches, or
articles if the subject matter is directly related to the individual's
official duties or the payment is made because of the individual's
status with the Government) by a Member, officer, or employee,
excluding any actual and necessary travel expenses.245
The parenthetical clause excepts a series of writings or speeches from
the flat prohibition against honoraria.2" Government employees
may accept honoraria for a series of expressive activities if the subject
matter is unrelated to the individual's official duties.247
It is not clear why relaxation of the flat ban was warranted for a
series of expressive activities but not for a single incident.2' No
explanation for the differential treatment is provided in either the
original statute, the amendment, or in debates during passage of
these laws.249 The clause itself provides little guidance on how
ethics officials or federal employees should interpret the nexus
requirement.
Honoraria may not be accepted if the subject of a series of
expressive activities "directly relate[s]" to official duties or is paid
244. Legislative Branch Appropriations Act, 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-90, § 314(b), 105 Stat. 447,
469 (codified at 5 U.S.C. app. § 505(3) (1994)).
245. 5 U.S.C. app. § 505(3) (1994).
246. Id. Prior to the 1992 Amendment, the term "honorarium" meant the following.
[A] payment of money or any thing of value for an appearance, speech or article by
a member, officer or employee, excluding any actual and necessary travel expenses
incurred by such individual (and one relative) to the extent that such expenses are
paid or reimbursed by any other person, and the amount otherwise determined shall
be reduced by the amount of any such expenses to the extent that such expenses are
not paid or reimbursed.
Id.
247. The inconsistent treatment given to a series of expressions as opposed to a single event
was highlighted by several of the Justices during oral argument for United States v. NTEU. See
Federal Employees: Justices Debate Whether Ban on Honoraria Violates Federal Workers'Free Speech, Daily
Rep. for Execs. (BNA) at A-215 (Nov. 9, 1994). The nexus analysis required for a series
undercuts the government's argument that a nexus requirement would be too burdensome. Id.
248. SeeUnited States v. NTEU, 115 S. Ct. 1003,1016(1995) (calling series exception "rather
strange parenthetical").
249. Cf EricJ. Murdock, Finally, Government Ethics as if People Mattered. Some Thoughts on the
Ethics Reform Act of 1989, 58 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 503,503 (1990) (noting thatAct went through
Congress very quickly and "no committee or conference reports were prepared").
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because of the employee's "status with the government. ""' In her
concurring opinion in NTEU, Justice O'Connor recommended
expanding the application of this language to single instances of
expressive activity."' If this brief clause were extended to single
acts, all government scientists could again be discouraged from
engaging in the usual and customary extra-employment activities that
private scientists are encouraged to engage in for compensation.252
B. Department of Defense Exception
Later in 1992, Congress enacted a more detailed nexus passage,
lifting the prohibition against receipt of honoraria for employees and
students at United States military academies.253  Employees at
Department of Defense schools may receive honoraria for "an
appearance, a speech, or an article published in a bona fide publica-
tion if such [activity] is customary for scholarly or academic activities
normally associated with institutions of higher learning."5
Receipt of honoraria under the Department of Defense modifica-
tion remains contingent on several conditions. The subject matter of
the activity must not "relate primarily to the responsibilities, policies,
or programs of the school at which the individual is a faculty
member.""5  In addition, the activity cannot involve government
resources,2-6 must not be offered by a person who will be affected
by performance of the faculty members duties, 257 and is limited to
a maximum of $2000.2 s
Within these restrictions, faculty members at Department of
Defense schools may receive honoraria. Furthermore, the statute
allows certain government employees to receive honoraria for
expressive activities "within [their] academic or military specialty. 259
The subject matter will not be deemed to relate primarily to the
250. 5 U.S.C. app. § 505(3) (1994).
251. See NTEU, 115 S. Ct. at 1021-22 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (asserting that exclusion of single event without nexus to employee's official duties would
be more consistent with congressional intent behind honorarium ban).
252. See supra Part LA (describing typical activities engaged in by scientists for information
exchange and professional development).
253. SeeNational Defense Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 102-484, § 542,106 Stat. 2315,2413-
14 (1992) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 2161 (note) (1994)) (authorizing personnel at military
schools to accept honoraria under limited circumstances and creating exception to honorarium
ban for faculty members and students at qualified Department of Defense schools).
254. l
255. I& § 542(a) (1).
256. Id § 542(a)(2).
257. i. § 542(a) (4).
258. Id- § 542(f).
259. Id. § 542(b).
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school at which the individual is employed "if the preparation and
presentation of the particular appearance, speech, or article is clearly
outside of the individual's duties."2 ° This exception resembles the
ethics regulations governing executive branch employees before
passage of the honorarium ban because it permits compensation for
expressive activities within a government employee's particular area
of expertise as long as the focus is not on the employee's job or
employing institution.6 1 Passage of this exception also indicates
congressional recognition that receipt of honoraria is an accepted
practice in certain scholarly and academic fields and that parity in
ethical standards for all government workers is not essential.6 2
C. Legislative Attempts at Modifying the Honorarium Ban
Congress began consideration of proposals to add a nexus
requirement for executive branch employees as early as January 3,
1991, just two days after the honorarium restriction went into
effect." In 1991, four separate bills sought to modify the honorari-
um restriction for executive branch employees. 2 4 All four of these
proposals would have lifted the honorarium ban for career executive
branch employees who engage in income-producing activities
unrelated to their official duties if the payor of the compensation had
no direct interest in the employees official position.2  In addition,
two of the proposals required disclosure of any honorarium received
260. Id.
261. See supra text accompanying note 143 (laying out pre-1991 Office of Government Ethics
(OGE) test for acceptance of honoraria).
262. See id. (specifically allowing acceptance of honoraria for "customary" scholarly and
academic activities). The President's Commission on Federal Ethics Law Reform (the Wilkey
Commission) expressed a similar opinion. Although the 'Wilkey Commission recognized that
"honoraria paid to officials can be a camouflage for efforts by individuals or entities to gain the
officials' favor," it also recognized the value of "scholarly articles," which "can benefit both the
federal employees and society at large." WIItEY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 155, at 35-37.
263. See Modifying the Honoraria Prohibition Hearing, supra note 27, at 204 (reporting that
several members of Congress initiated steps to amend Ethics Reform Act of 1989 in order to
eliminate unintended federal employees from honoraria prohibition); seegenerally H.R. 109,102d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); H.R. 325, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); H.R. 414, 102d Cong., 1st Seas.
(1991); H.R. 474, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
264. See Modiring the Honoraria Prohibition Hearing, supra note 27, at 2-11 (providing text of
four bills).
265. See Modifying the Honoraria Prohibition Hearing, supra note 27, at 2-11 (recognizing need
to prohibit honoraria on individual basis determined by nature of employee's unofficial
supplemental income). For example, H.R. 325, presented by Representative Barney Frank,
would have lifted the honorarium ban if "the subject of the appearance, speech, or article and
the reason for which the honorarium is paid is unrelated to that individual's official duties or
status" and "the party offering the honorarium has no interests that may be substantially affected
by the performance or nonperformance of that individual's official duties." H.R. 325, 102d
Cong., lst Sess. 2 (1991).
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and specified that the honorarium must be within "usual and
customary" limits, under a maximum dollar amount of $2000.266
Representative Barney Frank proposed a bill to modify the
honoraria prohibition in 1993, which ultimately did not pass.267
Two years later Representative Frank proposed an almost identical
bill.21 This bill, which is currently in committee, would allow
honorarium for "an appearance, a speech, or an article in a bona fide
publication" if three criteria were met.269  First, the subject of the
activity could not relate primarily to the government agencies'
"responsibilities, policies, or programs"270 and should not involve
government resources or nonpublic information.27 ' Second, the
honorarium could not be paid because of the government employee's
official duties or status.272 Third, the party providing the honorari-
um could not have interests that would be substantially affected by
either the performance or nonperformance of the employee's
duties. 273
These three criteria replicate elements of the nexus analyses
presented by the Department of Defense exception 274 and the OGE
outside income restrictions. 275 Despite a general consensus about
the excessive reach of § 501 (b), the 1991 proposal, which passed in
the House, did not pass the Senate, falling short by a single vote.
276
Moreover, Congress never enacted the 1993 bill 277 and the legisla-
tion introduced in 1995 has not reached a vote in either house.273
266. Modifying the Honoraria Prohibition Hearing, supranote 27, at4, 8-9 (containingmaximum
limits included in H.R. 325 and H.R. 414).
267. See I.RL 1095, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (proposing that honorarium would be
permitted when activity met specified criteria).






274. Cf National Defense Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 102-484, § 542,106 Stat. 2315,2413-
14 (1992) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 2161 note (1994)) (authorizing honorarium when activity
does not relate to school activities, or involve government resources, or is not related to
individual's performance as member of armed forces or government employee); see supra Part
III.B (evaluating Department of Defense exception).
275. See Standards of Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch, 5 C.F.R.
§ 2635.807(a) (2) (i) (B)-(D) (1995) (addressing limitations on receipt of compensation related
to teaching, speaking, and writing); supra text accompanying note 143 (listing Office of
Government Ethics criteria for receipt of honoraria).
276. See NTEU v. United States, 788 F. Supp. 4, 14 n.15 (D.D.C. 1992) (stating that proposal
to eliminate honorarium ban for activities unrelated to employment "was prevented of
consideration by the Senate by the objection of a single U.S. Senator"), affld, 990 F.2d 1271
(D.C. Cir. 1993), aff'd in part, rev'd in par4 115 S. Ct. 1003 (1995).
277. H.R. 1095, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
278. H.R. 1639, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
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The decision in NTEU is likely to lead to a renewed effort in
Congress to add a nexus requirement to the honorarium ban.
79
Although a nexus requirement burdens less speech than a total ban,
the government's interests in protecting against the appearance of
impropriety and in maintaining the focus of public servants are not
addressed by a nexus requirement. Moreover, a nexus requirement
would keep government scientists from accepting moderate amounts
of honoraria for customary activities. The enormous scope of
government agencies with scientific missions, such as the NIH, could
preclude employees from speaking about any scientific subject."'
IV. GOVERNMENT SCIENTISTS SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED TO ACCEPT
HONORARIA
In NTEU, Justice Stevens found merit in "the powerful and realistic
presumption that the federal work force consists of dedicated and
honorable civil servants."28' This sentiment is echoed by a scientist
who asserts that the vast majority of scientists do not engage in
intentional misconduct.
282
In NTEU, the Court also recognized the strong governmental
interest in preventing even the appearance of impropriety.
283
Congress may need to enact strict conflict of interest regulations to
avoid the perception of impropriety." But the factors that deter-
mine what appears improper should vary according to the usual and
customary practices for a particular profession.2' For scientists,
engaging in extra-employment activities related to one's area of
professional expertise is a usual and customary practice that can have
beneficial effects for the scientist, the public, and the employing
institution.286
279. See Biskupic, supra note 10, at Al, A9 (stating that members of Congress are already
working on legislation to ban honoraria when activities relate to federal employment).
280. See O/ce of Government Ethics Hearing, supra note 1, at 173 (statement of Robert J.
Cousins) (expressing concern that conflict of interest regulations could preclude government
scientists from all outside activities within their areas of expertise).
281. United States v. NTEU, 115 S. Ct. 1003, 1018 (1995).
282. See Kenneth J. Rothman, Conflict of Interest: The New McCarthyism in Science, 269JAMA
2782, 2782 (1993) (arguing that concerns about extent of misconduct are exaggerated).
283. See IVTEU, 115 S. Ct. at 1015-16.
284. SeeQUADRENNIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supranote 130, at 229,232 (recommending that
strict rules prohibiting honoraria are needed where potential for abuse is obvious to public).
285. See NTEU v. United States, 990 F.2d 1271, 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (contrasting expansive
duties of legislators with narrower duties of executive branch employees), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part, 115 S. Ct. 1003 (1995).
286. See supra Part I.A (listing benefits of outside employment activities such as information
flow, enhanced utilization of technologies, and improved medical services).
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After NTEU, the future of the honorarium ban's application to
government scientists below the rank of GS-16 depends on legislative
inclusion of a nexus requirement. 2s' For scientists, a connection is
generally present between outside professional activities and employ-
ment area. Because of this connection, a nexus clause could infringe
on the ability of government scientists to engage in virtually all extra-
employment activities. For this reason, if the honorarium ban is
modified to include a nexus requirement, government scientists must
be expressly exempted from the prohibition.
Honorarium restrictions do not exist in isolation. If government
scientists are exempted from an honorarium ban with or without a
nexus provision, they will still be subject to a variety of federal outside-
income restrictions.2" Executive branch employees were subject to
extensive regulations before the passage of the honorarium ban."'
Similar regulations are still in place, making an additional bar to
honoraria for activities that bear a relationship to government
employment unnecessary.21°  Unless government scientists are
expressly exempted from such a requirement, they will again be
subject to a bar that hampers professional development and decreases
the attractiveness of public service.
A. Regulations Governing Federally Funded Scientists
The NIH is overseen by the Public Health Service (PHS).291 In
1989, the NIH requested comments on proposed guidelines regarding
financial interests of research investigators receiving federal funds.292
In response, the NIH and the PHS were inundated with more than
750 comments, overwhelmingly in opposition to the proposed
guidelines.293 The PHS took the comments into consideration and
287. See NTEU, 115 S. Ct. at 1023 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(suggesting that Court's holding should be limited to speech without nexus to employment);
see also Biskupic, supra note 10, at Al (noting that legislative proposals to include a nexus
requirement are already underway).
288. See generally Standards of Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch, 5 C.F.R.
§ 2635 (1995) (presenting limits on income from outside activities for executive branch
employees).
289. See supra Part IIA1 (detailing OGE analysis of outside income before passage of Ethics
Reform Act).
290. See 5 C.F.R. § 2636.202(b) (1995) (prohibiting receipt of compensation by federal
employees for expressive activities that focus on their "official duties or on the responsibilities,
policies and programs of [their] employing agency"); see also supra Part III (evaluating legislative
nexus requirements).
291. 42 U.S.C. § 203 (1994).
292. See 59 Fed. Reg. 33,242, 33,243 (1994) (discussing NIH proposal published in NIH
Guide for Grants and Contracts).
293. See Christopher Anderson, Agendes Set Rules on FinancialDisclosure, 265 SCIENCE 179, 179
(1994) (reporting that three months into comment period for proposed rules, agency received
922
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issued proposed rules in 1994.2" Final rules were published in the
Federal Register in July 1995."95
These rules place the onus on researchers applying for federal
funds to disclose their "[s]ignificant [f]inancial [i]nterests. "296
Payments which, in the aggregate, do not exceed $10,000 annually do
not need to be disclosed. 97 The dollar limit was raised from $5000
to $10,000 because of comments indicating that "interests up to this
amount do not raise conflict of interest concerns."298  If a possible
conflict is identified by the scientist, the institution involved has
discretion to order public disclosure of the interest, external oversight
or modification of the research, or even divestiture of the inter-
est.
299
These rules indicate that the scientific community is sensitive to
dangers stemming from the commercialization of scientific re-
search."t° Instead of prohibiting financial ties between researchers
and private industry, however, most scientific entities support
requirements that combine full .disclosure of all relevant interests 01
with institutional review of the information provided.30 2  These
requirements allow a researcher's peers, those most informed about
what is customary in a particular field, to evaluate the propriety of a
financial arrangement."' With respect to honoraria, scrutiny should
more than 750 letters running 10-to-1 against proposal).
294. 59 Fed. Reg. 33,242 (1994).
295. 60 Fed. Reg. 35,810 (1995) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 50).
296. I at 35,816. "Significant Financial Interests" are defined as "anything of monetary
value, including but not limited to salary or other payments for services (e.g., consulting fees or
honoraria); equity interests (e.g., stocks, stock options or other ownership interests); and
intellectual property rights (e.g., patents, copyrights and royalties from such rights)." Id
297. Id
298. 1&
299. Id at 35,817; see also Anderson, supra note 293, at 179 (noting that institutions rather
than government entities have discretion about how to handle potential conflict).
300. See Is Sciencefor Sale?, supra note 22, at 179 (listing potential problems resulting from
academic-industry partnerships).
301. See Is Scienfor Sale?, supra note 22, at 10 (statement of Sheldon Krimsky) (recommend-
ing disclosure of financial interests when applying for grants, seeking appointments, or
submitting articles for publication); George D. Lundberg & Annette Flanagin, New Requirements
for Authors: Signed Statements of Authorship Responsibility and Financial Disclosure, 262 JAMA 2003,
2004 (1989) (informing authors that journal has added honoraria to list of financial interests
that must be disclosed before publication).
302. See 60 Fed. Reg. 35,810 (1995) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 50) (requiring disclosure
of any interest of significant monetary value, including payments for honoraria); Maatz, supra
note 84, at 181 (recommending disclosure of "all relevant personal interests"); Witt & Gostin,
supra note 3, at 550 ("Disclosure of financial interests is the bedrock of any sensible scheme.").
303. SeeArnold S. Relman, Publishing Biomedical Research: Roles and Responsibilities, HASTINGS
CTm. REP., May-June 1990, at 23, 24-27 (advocating heightened responsibility in peer-review
system to ensure integrity and utility of research results).
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be intensified when payment comes from an individual or entity with
an interest in the outcome of research conducted by the scientist."'
Commentators have also suggested that receipt of honoraria from
sources that do not have a direct interest in a particular study requires
less stringent regulation than other kinds of financial interests.03
Presentations and articles made by a scientist to the public or to
scientific peers promote the exchange of information.0° Compen-
sation agreements that involve extraordinary sums or a percentage of
future profits307 pose greater dangers than one-time honoraria
payments of a pre-determined amount, not exceeding $10,000
annually. Placing a cap on the per incident and annual amount of
honoraria that scientists may receive reduces the incentive for
scientists to compromise their careers by misrepresenting or fabricat-
ing research data.
Accurately assessing the frequency or degree of conscious or
unconscious bias introduced into biomedical research by financial
conflicts of interest is difficult.3° Many of the publicized cases of
alleged wrongdoing involve significant sums of money.0 9 Restrict-
ing honoraria to reasonable amounts, asjudged against sums received
by other scientists for comparable work, should help deter incentives
to engage in unethical conduct. Moreover, disclosure by scientists of
any and all honoraria would allow institutions,310 medical jour-
nals, 1 and the public 12 to assess the reasonableness of amounts
304. See Maatz, supra note 84, at 186 ("[U]niversity researchers should not ... receive
honoraria or other payment from private sources if their university research involves evaluating
the effectiveness of a product developed by the private company."); cf supra notes 40-42 and
accompanying text (describing allegations of misconduct by researcher who received large
honoraria from drug companies whose products he was evaluating).
305. See Witt & Gostin, supra note 3, at 550 (suggesting that honoraria and consulting fees
require least restrictive regulation).
306. See Eisenberg, supra note 23, at 182 (noting idea that prompt disclosure of observations
within scientific community "facilitates the progress ofscience"); Relman, supra note 303, at 23
(pointing to scientificjournal articles as major source of medical information for public).
307. See Is Scence for Sale?, supra note 22, at 316 (reprinting NIH proposed guidelines
prohibiting "personal equity holdings or options in any company that would be affected by the
outcome of the research").
308. See Is Sciencefor Sale?, supra note 22, at 10 (statement of Sheldon Krimsky) ("There are
no good data that link commercial affiliation with fraud or arise in actual conflicts of interest
as compared with the appearance of conflicts of interest.").
309. See ScENTIc MIscoNDucr REPORT, supra note 3, at 10-50 (listing several cases of
possible scientific misconduct where scientists received more than $10,000 in non-salary
compensation including stocks in pharmaceutical companies).
310. See 42 C.F.R. § 50.103 (1995) (requiring disclosure to institutional official who will
evaluate acceptability).
311. See Lundberg & Flanagin, supra note 301, at 2004 (reporting requirement of disclosure
to editors, who will evaluate possibility of bias in articles).
312. See Relman, supra note 303, at 23 (citing peer-reviewed journal articles as most
important source of science stories in popular media).
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received by government scientists and to evaluate the interests of the
payor in the government employee's work. Restrictions on the
amount of honoraria, combined with public disclosure will bring
unusual circumstances to the attention of anyone evaluating the
expressive activity of a scientific researcher.
313
B. The Benefits from Honoraria Outweigh the Costs
Restrictions on amounts of acceptable honoraria and public
disclosure requirements impose a greater burden on the government
and regulating institutions than does a flat ban on honoraria.
3 1 4
Arguments that this burden is too great, however, are undercut by
three factors. First, federal standards regulating financial conflicts of
interest for researchers who are not federal employees, but who
receive federal funds, already require the government to review all
interests disclosed by those individuals.
3 1 5
Second, the flat ban on honoraria has been lifted for certain
federal employees at Department of Defense academies. 6 These
individuals may receive honoraria for speeches on topics within their
areas of expertise, as long as the speeches are unrelated to the official
responsibilities of the academies.31 7 Circumscription of permissible
topics suggests that government ethics officers must evaluate the
character of the expressive activity. Moreover, this legislation
highlights Congress' recognition of the importance of honoraria for
certain scholarly professions and the non-essentiality of identical
ethical regulations for all federal employees.
Finally, in 1992 Congress amended the definition of honoraria to
include a nexus requirement when an employee engages in a series
of expressive activities as opposed to a single activity. 8  This
amendment indicates that institutional ethics officers are capable of
313. See Is Scence for Sale?, supra note 22, at 182 (statement of Erich Bloch) (listing
replication of results and peer review as measures for "self-correction" within scientific
community); Lundberg & Flanagin, supra note 301, at 2004 ("When appropriate, notices of
financial disclosure are published as a part of the article so that readers may be aware of possible
biases the authors may have.").
314. See United States v. NTEU, 115 S. Ct. 1003, 1016-18 (1995) (recounting government's
assertion that ease of administration justifies broad ban).
315. See 60 Fed. Reg. 35,810 (1995) (presenting final conflict of interest rules for research
scientists receiving funds from the Public Health Service); Is Science for Sale?, supra note 22, at
298-99 (reprinting PHS Form 2590 requiring disclosure of all federal and nonfederal support
for grant applicants).
316. 10 U.S.C. § 2161 note (1994); see supra Part IU.B (discussing Department of Defense
exception).
317. See 10 U.S.C. § 2161 note.
318. 5 U.S.C. app. § 505(3) (1994); see also supra Part IIIA (raising issue of inconsistent
treatment for single event and series of expressive activities).
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performing a case-by-case analysis of situations involving receipt of
honoraria.1 9
Only the top researchers in a particular field receive invitations to
speak and write articles for compensation.3 12 The honorarium ban
remains in place for prominent government scientists who serve above
the GS-16 level. 21 Consequently, these are the influential and
productive members of the scientific community who will eschew
government service if government scientists are subject to an
honoraria bar.322  The government's interest in efficient operation
of its institutions will be undercut by the resulting loss in or contin-
ued absence of quality personnel.
Furthermore, allowing scientists to accept honoraria will not
undermine the government's interest in avoiding even the appearance
of impropriety. 23 The practice of receiving honoraria is customary
in scientific fields. Receipt of honoraria may be prohibited under
special circumstances, 24 but disclosure of compensation along with
limits and peer review provide sufficient protection against miscon-
duct. Scientists who speak or write about their research perform an
important function because they disseminate information within and
beyond the scientific community.
A prohibition against receipt of honoraria for activities that relate
to government employment is unnecessary for scientists. The interest
of the payor in the outcome of a research project triggers concern
about impropriety, not the subject matter of the expression. Receipt
of honoraria is not inherently unethical," therefore, the cost to the
government of having a less prestigious, creative, or prolific
workforce, will not be offset by a corresponding gain in ethical
conduct. 6 Overall, the benefits of allowing government scientists
to accept honoraria outweigh the costs.
319. See NTEU, 115 S. Ct. at 1016-17 (stating that series exception unambiguously reveals
congressional confidence in agency ethics officials' ability to enforce nexus test).
320. See Robert C. Young, Honoraria Ban for Federal Workers Will Dismantle Scientific Expertise:
Inflexible Net of Rules May Drive Talent Away, WASH. POST, Jan. 14, 1992, at H6 (explaining that
only best and brightest are impacted by honorarium ban).
321. See NTEU, 115 S. Ct. at 1018-19 (enjoining enforcement of honorarium ban to executive
branch employees below GS-16).
322. See Young, supra note 320, at H6 (speculating that top scientists who are intermittent
government employees will resign if accepting honoraria is prohibited).
323. See IYTEU, 115 S. Ct. at 1017 (holding that government must demonstrate more than
mere speculation of harm).
324. See Is Science for Sale?, supra note 22, at 181-82 (statement of Erich Bloch) (discouraging
financial ties during clinical drug trials or when public policy is being decided).
325. See Rothman, supra note 282, at 2782 (emphasizing difference between temptation to
act unethically and doing so).
326. See Is Science for Sale?, supra note 22, at 182 (statement of Erich Bloch) (questioning
value of conflict of interest regulations under all but few special circumstances).
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CONCLUSION
Congress crafted the prohibition against honoraria for its own
members but extended § 501 (b) to all government employees. The
comprehensive ban, which is appropriate for legislators, is unsuitable
for government researchers employed by scientific institutions.
Scientists who receive federal funds, but who are employed outside
the government, are subject to per incident and yearly honoraria
limits, and they must disclose all financial interests for institutional
and peer review. These regulations resemble standards of conduct
already in effect for government scientists and are sufficient to protect
against even the appearance of impropriety created by receipt of
honoraria for activities that bear a nexus to government employment.
Federal scientists who remain subject to the honorarium ban after
NVTEU should be exempted from it. Furthermore, new legislation
imposing a prohibition on honoraria only when a nexus between the
expressive activity and government employment is present is misguid-
ed. Neither the appearance of impropriety that stems from the
relationship between the payor and the government employee nor the
concern that government workers will be distracted by extra-employ-
ment activities are addressed by a nexus requirement. If such
legislation is passed, scientists at all levels of government service
should be expressly exempted from the honorarium ban so that they
may contribute to the dissemination of scientific information and
enjoy the benefits of extra-employment expressive activities as do their
peers employed outside the government.
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